Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should Sec. 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code by Applied to Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies? by Schilling, Stephen E.
DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal 
Volume 9 
Issue 4 Summer 2011 Article 2 
Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should Sec. 546(e) of the Bankruptcy 
Code by Applied to Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies? 
Stephen E. Schilling 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen E. Schilling, Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should Sec. 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code by Applied to 
Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies?, 9 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 471 (2011) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol9/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. 
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code be Applied to Leveraged Buyouts of
Private Companies?
Stephen E. Schilling*
I. Introduction ............................................ 472
II. B ackground ............................................. 475
A. W hat is an LBO? ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  475
1. LBO H istory ................................... 476
2. Avoidability of LBOs ........................... 478
B. LBOs and Fraudulent Transfer Law ................ 479
C. In re QSI Holdings, Inc ............................. 482
1. QSI's Arguments and Reasoning ............... 484
a. Plain M eaning .............................. 485
i. The Definition of "Settlement
Paym ent" ....... ....................... 485
ii. Public versus Private LBOs ............. 486
iii. Absurd Results? ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  486
iv. "Financial Institution" ................. 487
b. Congressional Intent ........................ 488
c. Policy ....................................... 488
2. QSI's H olding .................................. 489
III. A nalysis ................................................. 489
A . Plain M eaning? ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  490
1. "Settlement Payment" ......................... 490
a. The Clearance and Settlement System ...... 491
b. Influential Cases that Define Settlement
Paym ent .................................... 492
c. The Legislative History of Settlement
Paym ent .................................... 496
d. "Commonly Used in the Securities Trade" . 498
e. The Meaning of Settlement Payment is
A m biguous ................................. 506
* J.D. University of Dayton School of Law, 2010; B.A. University of Pittsburgh, 1992. The
author works in Cincinnati, Ohio, as a Judicial Law Clerk for the Honorable Michael R. Barrett,
United States District Judge, Southern District of Ohio. Special thanks are due to Professor
Jeffrey W. Morris, Samuel A. McCray Chair in Law, University of Dayton School of Law. His
help, guidance, and inspiration made this paper possible.
472 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
2. "By or To" a "Financial Institution" ........... 507
a. What is "a Commodity Broker, Forward
Contract Merchant, Stockbroker, Financial
Institution, Financial Participant, or
Securities Clearing Agency"? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
b. A Beneficial Interest in the Funds .......... 509
c. W ire Transfers .............................. 513
d. "By or To" a "Financial Institution"
Conclusion .................................. 514
3. Plain Meaning Conclusion ...................... 515
B. Congressional Intent ................................ 516
1. Legislative History .............................. 518
2. Congress's Intent ............................... 521
3. Congressional Intent Conclusion ................ 523
C. Public Policy ........................................ 524
1. Conflict within the Law ......................... 524
2. Shareholders Bear No Risk ..................... 526
3. An Issue of "Fairness" ......................... 528
4. Risk of Fraud, Especially for Private
Com panies ...................................... 529
5. Policy Conclusion ............................... 530
IV . Conclusion .............................................. 530
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since corporate raiders of the 1980s first used leveraged
buyouts (LBOs) to take over public companies there has been tension
about the morality, business sense, and legality of LBOs. 1 From their
controversial beginnings, a debate has raged over whether LBOs are
fraudulent transfers.2 This debate has played out in the legal arena of
bankruptcy courts, which have long considered LBOs to be potentially
fraudulent conveyances. 3 This debate has continued for at least
twenty-five years, and it endures to this day with no sign of resolu-
tion.4 One of the most recent and interesting battles in this long-run-
1. Steven N. Kaplan, The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance: We Are All Henry Kravis
Now, 1 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 7 (1997).
2. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985); David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bank-
ruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985).
3. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1291 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) ("[T]his case represents the first significant application of the
UFCA to leveraged buy-out financing.").
4. See id.
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ning war is the Sixth Circuit's decision QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford
(QSI 111). 5
Throughout most of the 1990s, the burning question was whether
Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) 6 could protect LBOs of public companies
from being overturned as fraudulent transfers. 7 That battle is nearly
over, and the pro-LBO forces are winning. Today, in a majority of
circuits that have considered the question, § 546(e), which provides
that a transfer that is a settlement payment made by or to a stockbro-
ker or a financial institution may not be avoided,8 has been held to bar
trustees from overturning LBOs as constructively fraudulent convey-
ances.9 The next phase of the war is the battle over whether § 546(e)
applies to LBOs of private companies.
As recently as 1999, it was unclear whether § 546(e) could protect
an LBO of a privately held corporation. 10 In fact, at that point the
trend was that § 546(e) did not shield LBOs of private companies.
The only two cases to directly consider the question both held that
5. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI I1), 571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010). The story of QSI Holdings was told in three separate
opinions from three courts: Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355
B.R. 629 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI 11), 382 B.R. 731 (W.D.
Mich. 2007); and QSI 111, 571 F.3d 545.
6. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the
United States Code. 11 U.S.C. (2006).
7. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990); Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1213 (1992); Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Comark), 971 F.2d 322 (9th
Cir. 1992); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. ex rel. Raleigh v. Schottenstein (In
re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 131 B.R. 655 (N.D. I11. 1991); Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re
Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l,
Inc.), 195 B.R. 971 (Bankr. D. Mass 1996).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
9. Based strictly on appellate court cases (no district or bankruptcy court cases) that specifi-
cally have applied § 546(e) to LBOs (and not to swap agreements, forward contracts, etc.) the
current circuit split breaks down as follows. Applying § 546(e) to shield LBOs of private compa-
nies are the Third (Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2389 (2010)), Sixth (QSI 111, 571 F.3d 545), and Eighth Circuits
(Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2009)). The Tenth Circuit (In re
Kaiser Steel, 952 F.2d 1230) has applied § 546(e) to shield LBOs of public companies. Only the
Eleventh Circuit (Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604 (11th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1068 (1998)) has ruled that § 546(e) is not available to shield
public or private LBOs. The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, along with
the District of Columbia and Federal Circuits, have heard no cases applying § 546(e) to LBOs
(although some have applied § 546(e) in other situations).
10. Mark J. Thompson, In Re Resorts International, Inc.: Third Circuit Effectively Bars Appli-
cation of Fraudulent Conveyance Statute to Payments to Public Shareholders in Leveraged
Buyouts, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETr LLP, Aug. 4,1999, at 5, available at http://www.stblaw.
com/content/publications/pub393.pdf.
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§ 546(e) did not apply to privately held entities.11 But since then,
there has been a significant shift in the law. What happened in QSI-
§ 546(e) being applied to the LBO of a closely held corporation12-is
a relatively recent development in the long battle between LBOs and
§ 546(e).1 3
The issue in QSI was "whether § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
applies to privately traded securities. ' 14 This was an issue of first im-
pression for the Sixth Circuit. 15 Finding no difference in the Code
between publicly and privately traded securities, the Sixth Circuit held
that § 546(e) applies to privately traded securities. 16
When deciding whether § 546(e) should be applied to LBOs of pri-
vately held entities, three questions arise: Is the Sixth Circuit's holding
justified by the statutory language? Is it justified by congressional in-
tent? And, is it good public policy? The applicability of § 546(e) to
LBOs of privately held entities based on the statutory language and
congressional intent is ambiguous. Furthermore, it is bad public pol-
icy. Because statutory language and congressional intent do not yield
a definitive answer, policy should be the deciding factor.
Part II of this paper sets out the history and legally significant de-
tails of LBOs and concludes with an analysis of all three QSI deci-
sions. Part III investigates the three issues of this paper's thesis: (1)
whether the statutory language justifies applying § 546(e) to LBOs of
private companies; (2) whether congressional intent justifies applying
§ 546(e) to LBOs of private companies; and (3) whether applying
11. Jewel Recovery, 196 B.R. at 353 ("[Section] 546(e) does not apply to this [private] transac-
tion ...."); Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 677 (D.R.I. 1998) ("Private transactions
lack the impact on the public market trading systems that Congress intended to protect by
§ 546(e)."). Even as late as 2003 it appeared that an LBO of a privately held company would
never be protected by § 546(e). Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Asea Brown Boveri,
Inc. (In re Grand Eagle Cos., Inc.), 288 B.R. 484, 494-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
12. QSI I11, 571 F.3d at 547 ("[W]e now hold.., that § 546(e) is not limited to publicly traded
securities but also extends to transactions ... involving privately held securities.").
13. Although it is not widely recognized (it may not be recognized at all), the first published
decision to apply § 546(e) to an LBO of a private company was from April 7, 2005. Loranger
Mfg. Corp. v. PNC Bank (In re Loranger Mfg. Corp.), 324 B.R. 575, 585-86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2005). However, this case was not a traditional LBO-it was more of a leveraged stock buyback.
Id. at 578. The company borrowed money to redeem the shares of one of its owners. Id. It fit
the mold of an LBO case nonetheless. Other cases applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private compa-
nies quickly followed. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Clark (In re Nat'l
Forge Co.), 344 B.R. 340 (W.D. Pa. 2006). National Forge was decided a mere four months
before the Western District of Michigan Bankruptcy Court offered the first QS1 decision. Qual-
ity Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R. 629 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2006) (Oct. 26, 2006).
14. QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 547.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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§ 546(e) to LBOs of private companies is good public policy. Part III
concludes that because the statutory language and congressional in-
tent is ambiguous, the wisest policy choice should control, and
§ 546(e) should not be applied to LBOs of private companies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is an LBO?
In a leveraged buyout, "a company is sold to a small number of
investors, typically including members of the company's management,
under financial arrangements in which there is a minimum amount of
equity and a maximum amount of debt."'1 7 Stated more simply, it is
the purchase of a company with borrowed funds secured by the com-
pany's assets. 18
The characteristics of an LBO often include the following: (1) the
majority of the purchase price is paid by loans from a third party; (2)
those loans are to be repaid with cash flow generated by the pur-
chased entity; (3) the loans are secured by liens on the stock or assets
of the purchased entity; (4) the buyer usually invests only a small
amount of capital as equity into the deal; (5) the purchased company's
balance sheet is highly leveraged; and (6) the buyer has no personal
liability for the debt. 19 The typical LBO structure takes one of three
basic forms: (1) a direct sale to the buyer; (2) a cash merger with the
buyer; or (3) a stock purchase by the buyer that may be followed with
a merger.20 Regardless of how it is structured, the buyer pays the sell-
ing stockholders for their shares.
Prior to the 2009 financial collapse,21 LBOs were rebounding in
popularity. "In 2006, LBOs, on a dollar basis, have accounted for 27
percent of all U.S. mergers and acquisitions, as compared to 14 per-
cent in 2005 and just 10 percent in 2000. Indeed, of the 10 largest
LBOs in U.S. history, eight occurred in 2006."22 Unsurprisingly con-
sidering the easy lending practices of the time, many of these LBOs
added heavy debt loads to the target companies "that in some cases
may require the targets to devote at least half of their yearly cash flow
17. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1292 (3d Cir. 1986).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (9th ed. 2009).
19. David W. Morse, Legal Issues in Leveraged Acquisitions: From the Lender's Perspective, in
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2010: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, at 325, 329 (PLI Corporate Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1781, 2010), available at Westlaw 1781 PLI/Corp 325.
20. Id.
21. See Steven Pearse, Accounting for the Lack of Accountability: The Great Depression Meets
the Great Recession, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 409, 420 (2010).
22. Gregory G. Hesse, Section 546(e) and the Return of the LBO, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22,
22 (2007).
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to meet the interest payments. ' 23 While the following discussion of
LBOs begins with an historical overview, the risks and rewards of
LBOs are a modern phenomenon that will remain with us for years to
come.
1. LBO History
The law of fraudulent conveyances began in 1571 with the English
Parliament's enactment of the Statute 13 of Elizabeth.2 4 This law
sought to stop debtors from transferring property to another with the
intent of defrauding creditors.2 5 Even back to that original statute,
transfers for good consideration were bona fide.26 However, the law's
biggest flaw as originally conceived was that fraudsters are usually
smart enough not to leave behind evidence of their intent. As a way
to counter this, courts established "badges of fraud," which were legal
shortcuts used to prove actual fraud.27 When present, badges of fraud
made a transfer presumptively invalid.28
The history of applying fraudulent transfer law to LBOs began with
one particularly influential case from the mid-1980s: United States v.
Tabor Court Realty Corp.29 This case involved the first significant ap-
plication of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 30 to a failed
LBO. 31 In Tabor, the Third Circuit ruled that a trustee could bring
23. Id.
24. John C. Murray & Paul L. Hammann, Creditors' Rights Issues in Loan Transactions, in
TITLE INSURANCE 2002: MASTERING CRITICAL ISSUES FACING BUYERS, SELLERS & LENDERS, at
483, 486 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 484, 2002), available at
Westlaw 484 PLI/Real 483. But see Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 531, 535 (1987) (discussing fraudulent conveyances under Roman law).
25. Murray & Hammann, supra note 24.
26. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 537.
27. Michael L. Cook, et al, Fraudulent Transfers, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRESSED
DEBT, RESTRUCTURING AND WORKOUTS 2011, at 533, 562 (PLI Commerical Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 933, 2011), available at Westlaw 933 PLI/Comm 533; see also DOUG-
LAS J. WHALEY & JEFFREY W. MORRIS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDI-
TOR LAW 18 (3d ed. 2006).
28. Cook, supra note 27.
29. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1291 (3d Cir. 1986). There were
prior decisions in this case under a different name decided by a lower court that were influential
as well. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983); United States v.
Gleneagles Inv. Co., 571 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584
F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
30. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT prefatory note (1984), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.pdf (indicating that the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act was the predecessor to the more recent Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act).
31. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d at 1291 ("[Tlhis case represents the first significant applica-
tion of the UFCA to leveraged buy-out financing."); Lisa G. Beckerman & Robert J. Stark,
LBOs and Fraudulent Conveyances: The Third Circuit Does an About Face, 2000 NORTON
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fraudulent conveyance claims against parties who orchestrate LBOs. 32
Today, applying fraudulent transfer law to failed LBOs seems like a
natural conclusion of the law, but this was not the case at the time.
The Tabor court ignored weighty advice to the contrary in making its
decision,33 and it ignored the lead of other cases it could have fol-
lowed.34 Tabor was particularly groundbreaking35 because in spite of
the early criticism,36 less than ten years later one court confidently
declared, "courts now uniformly hold that fraudulent conveyance laws
apply to LBOs. ''37 What courts had never done prior to 1986-apply
fraudulent transfer laws to failed LBOs-became standard procedure
by 1995. Tabor and cases that followed,38 in effect turned LBOs into a
badge of fraud39-a factual situation that raises a presumption of
fraud. The presence of an LBO does not raise a firm presumption of
fraud in all LBOs, but nonetheless, "[m]ost courts that have consid-
BANKR. L. ADVISER (West Group, Rochester, N.Y.), no. 2, Feb. 2000, available at http://www.
akingump.com/docs/publication/105.pdf.
32. Beckerman & Stark, supra note 31.
33. Id. (citing Baird & Jackson, supra note 2, at 852 ("A firm that incurs obligations in the
course of a buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his
brother for a pittance.")).
34. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985). Credit
Managers was decided less than a year before Tabor on a similar issue-applying § 5 of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act to a failed LBO. Id. at 177, n.1. It reached the opposite
conclusion. Credit Managers held that the LBO in question was not a fraudulent transfer. Id. at
189.
35. Anthony Michael Sabino, Applying the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances to Bankrupt
Leveraged Buyouts: The Bankruptcy Code's Increasing Leverage over Failed LBOs, 69 N.D. L.
REV. 15, 28 (1993); D. Christopher Carson, Analyzing and Pursuing Fraudulent Transfer Claims,
in UNDERSTANDING FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING FRAUDU-
LENT TRANSFER CLAIMS, DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE LITIGATION STRATEGY, AND RESPOND-
ING TO RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, at *6 (2009), available at 2009 WL 2510926.
36. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 2, at 854-55; Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. 175;
Kupetz v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 B.R. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1987), See also lannacone v.
Foothill Capital Corp. (In re Hancock-Nelson Mercantile Co.), 95 B.R. 982, 993-96 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1989) (discussing the resulting controversy and ultimate influence of the Tabor decision).
37. MFS/Sun Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Serv. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913,
933 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
38. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit
(In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Vadnais Lumber Supply,
Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply), 100 B.R. 127 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Ferrari v.
Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Alumi-
num Mills Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R. 869 (Bankr.
N.D. 111. 1991); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). See Sabino, supra note 35, at 22-28, for a discussion of how each of
these cases related to the development of the fraudulent transfer doctrine being applied to
LBOs.
39. Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 1165, 1188 (1995).
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ered the issue have decided that fraudulent transfer law should apply
to LBOs. ' '40
2. Avoidability of LBOs
Under the caselaw that developed following Tabor, it became com-
mon to apply fraudulent transfer law to LBOs.41 In the typical LBO,
a company (the target) is purchased with loans secured by the target's
own assets.42 If this new debt burden causes the target to have no
reasonable prospect of survival, the result is usually bankruptcy. 43 If
the target declares bankruptcy thereafter while the assets are still en-
cumbered, the unsecured creditors will not satisfy any part of their
claims from a sale of the assets. 44 If the LBO can be blamed for
dooming the target to unavoidable bankruptcy, "the payment to the
shareholders by the buyer of the corporation is deemed a fraudulent
conveyance because in exchange for the money the shareholders re-
ceived they provided no value to the corporation but merely increased
its debt and by doing so pushed it over the brink. ' 45 Accordingly,
when an LBO results in too high of a debt burden, a court may deem
it fraudulent thereby making the LBO subject to avoidance by a trus-
tee in bankruptcy.46
LBOs can be risky because the newly structured company has a sig-
nificantly higher debt to equity ratio. 47 This risk, however, is not
borne by the company's new owners; rather, it is carried by the un-
secured creditors who stand to lose everything in liquidation. 48 Be-
cause the lender nearly always assumes a senior lien position, it is only
at risk to the point it is undersecured. 49 This risk structure makes
LBOs attractive to buyers, sellers, and lenders alike because these
parties bear none of the risk (or at least very little as compared to
creditors) .50
A fundamental principle of corporate and bankruptcy law is that
creditors should be paid before ownership. 51 An LBO can short-cir-
40. Bay Plastics, Inc. v. BT Commercial Corp. (In re Bay Plastics, Inc.), 187 B.R. 315, 334
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
41. See supra note 38.
42. Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2009).
43. Id. at 792.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 646.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Morse, supra note 19, at 332 ("'debt' before 'equity"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006).
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cuit that principle by, in effect, paying equity before debt.52 Fraudu-
lent conveyance law protects creditors by giving them a way to reverse
an LBO. In applying fraudulent conveyance law to an LBO, courts
analyze the transaction with creditors' interests in mind.53
B. LBOs and Fraudulent Transfer Law
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee (or a debtor-in-possession in
a Chapter 11 case) 54 has certain powers to avoid a variety of prepeti-
tion transactions.5 5 This includes the power to avoid fraudulent trans-
fers under § 548.56 Section 548(a)(1)(A) avoids transfers where there
is an "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. '57 However, proving
52. Morse, supra note 19, at 329.
53. Id. at 333.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006); Bay Plastics, Inc. v. BT Commercial Corp. (In re Bay Plastics,
Inc.), 187 B.R. 315, 321-22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, "[u]nder certain circum-
stances, an official committee of creditors appointed in a chapter 11 case may also be authorized
by the bankruptcy court to do so on behalf of the estate." Mark G. Douglas, No Avoidance of
Payments by Financial Institution to LBO Shareholders Absent Actual Fraud, 1 JONES DAY Bus.
RESTRUCTURING REV., No. 2, May 2002, at 9, available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publica-
tion/f0274ad3-760f-4b6a-a2b5-7af9a4302Oel/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e3605820-7e
11-44a9-8f6f-dlbf6580a024/BR%20Review%2OVINo2.pdf; 4 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3d
§ 67:14 (West 2011).
55. Bay Plastics, 187 B.R. at 321. While § 548 makes a transfer avoidable, it is § 550 that
empowers the trustee to recover the avoided property. 11 U.S.C. § 550 ("[T]o the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section ... 548... the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate,
the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property").
56. Id. In its entirety, § 548(a) reads as follows:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of
an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an
employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2
years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involunta-
rily-
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that
such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would
be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obliga-
tion to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the
ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2006).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2006); 4 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 67:14 (West 2011).
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actual intent can be difficult. 58 In the alternative, § 548(a)(1)(B) pro-
vides an opportunity to prove constructive fraud.5 9
In addition to federal bankruptcy law, a trustee may avoid transac-
tions under state law.60 This is useful because § 548 only reaches back
two years from the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.61 State fraud-
ulent transfer laws typically have statute of limitations of four to seven
years.62
Every state has either a common law variety of the Statute of Eliza-
beth or a codification of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) or the more modern Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(UFA).63 UFrA § 5 states as follows:
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or in-
curred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was
insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of
the transfer or obligation. 64
This language is similar to § 548(a)(1)(B). 65 Rather than prohibiting
actual fraud, like § 548(a)(1)(A), § 548(a)(1)(B) and § 5 of the UFTA
prohibit constructive fraud. 66 Fraud is presumed once the elements of
§ 548(a)(1)(B) are proved.67
Parsing § 548(a)(1)(B) into its elements, it permits the avoidance of
any transfer of an interest in property or any obligation that was made
or incurred within the two years before the bankruptcy petition is filed
58. Douglas, supra note 54.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2006).
60. Douglas, supra note 54. Section 544(b) allows a trustee to "avoid any transfer of an inter-
est of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim .... 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2006).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2006). Prior to the 2005 BAPCPA amendments to the Code, it was
only a one-year reach back. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (West 2005).
62. Bay Plastics, Inc. v. BT Commercial Corp. (In re Bay Plastics, Inc.), 187 B.R. 315, 322
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09 (Deering 2011); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1336.09 (LexisNexis 2011).
63. Hydee R. Feldstein & Francis J. Aquila, Caveat Emptor: Distressed Acquisitions Yield
Rewards, But Risks Too, in GOING PRIVATE 2010: DOING THE DEAL RIGHT, at 311,315 n.2 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1796, 2010), available at Westlaw 1796
PLI/Corp 311.
64. UNIV. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 5(a), available at http:l/www.law.upenn.edu/bllI
archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.pdf.
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2006).
66. In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2006).
67. Id.
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(or longer if applying state law). 68 Once those initial hurdles are
cleared, avoidance is permitted if the debtor receives less than a rea-
sonably equivalent value in exchange and one of the following three
things occur: (1) the debtor was insolvent on the date of the transfer
or obligation or became insolvent as a result; (2) the debtor was en-
gaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which
the debtor's remaining capital was unreasonably small capital; or (3)
the debtor believed he was incurring or intended to incur debts be-
yond his ability to pay.69 Accordingly, what is "reasonably equivalent
value," 70 along with either insolvency, 71 "unreasonably small capi-
tal,"'72 or "debts beyond the ability to pay,"'73 becomes critical to this
analysis. As such, applying § 548(a)(1)(B) is primarily a factual
analysis. 74
Considering once again the influence of Tabor,75 at the same time
courts began to apply fraudulent transfer laws to LBOs, § 546(e) was
beginning its long march towards protecting those same failed
68. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Citicorp N. Am.
(In re TOUSA, Inc.), 422 B.R. 783, 858 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006); In re TOUSA, 422 B.R. at 858.
70. "'The test used to determine reasonably equivalent value in the context of a fraudulent
conveyance requires the court to determine the value of what was transferred and to compare it
to what was received."' In re TOUSA, 422 B.R. at 865 (quoting Barber v. Golden Seed Co., 129
F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997)).
71. The term "insolvent" means "that the sum of [an] entity's debts is greater than all of such
entity's property, at a fair valuation .... 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2006); In re TOUSA, 422
B.R. at 858.
72. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1070 (3d Cir. 1992). "'[U]nreasonably
small capital' . .. refer[s] to the inability to generate sufficient profits to sustain operations.
Because an inability to generate enough cash flow to sustain operations must precede an inabil-
ity to pay obligations as they become due, unreasonably small capital would seem to encompass
financial difficulties short of equitable solvency." Id.
73. In re TOUSA, 422 B.R. at 875. "'The "inability to pay debts" prong of section 548 is met
if it can be shown that the debtor made the transfer or incurred an obligation contemporaneous
with an intent or belief that subsequent creditors likely would not be paid as their claims ma-
tured."' Id. at 862 (quoting WRT Creditors Liquidation Trust v. WRT Bank. Litig. Master File
Defendants (In re WRT Energy Corp.), 282 B.R. 343, 415 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001)).
74. 4 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 67:4 (West 2011). See, e.g., Dixon v. Ruth (In re Gluth
Bros. Constr., Inc.), 424 B.R. 368, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) ("[T]he Plaintiff has offered no
factual allegations to support its claim that the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer
or became insolvent because of the transfer."); Angell v. Burrell (In re Caremerica, Inc.), 409
B.R. 759, 767 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009) ("In the absence of such factual content, the trustee can-
not show that avoidance of transfers under the theory of constructive fraud is plausible."); Fehrs
v. Fehrs (In re Fehrs), 391 B.R. 53, 74 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) ("The determination of 'reasona-
ble equivalence' is largely a factual question and, in order to determine whether a fair economic
exchange has occurred, the court must analyze all the circumstances surrounding the transfer in
question.").
75. See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
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LBOs. 76 Even among some of the early cases following Tabor's
groundbreaking application of fraudulent transfer law, § 546(e) was
an issue. 77 Accordingly, courts were pursuing a dual path of legal de-
velopment. On one path, courts applied fraudulent transfer laws to
LBOs. On a nearly contemporaneous path, courts protected those
same LBOs from fraudulent transfer laws by applying § 546(e).
C. In re QSI Holdings, Inc.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in QSI represents one of the latest cases
to apply § 546(e) to protect failed LBOs from fraudulent transfer law.
The issue was "whether § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to
privately traded securities. '78 The difference between QSI and most
other cases, and what made it an issue of first impression in the Sixth
Circuit, was the holding that "§ 546(e) is not limited to publicly traded
securities but also extends to transactions.., involving privately held
securities." 79
QSI began with a 1999 LBO of Quality Stores, Inc. (Quality) by
Central Tractor Farm and Country, Inc. and its parent company, CT
Holdings, Inc. (collectively the CT Parties). 80 Quality was a private
corporation operating a chain of 112 agricultural products retail stores
located primarily in rural communities in and around the Midwest.81
Quality's products included a mix of niche retail items of interest to
part-time and hobby farmers, homeowners, and do-it-yourselfers. 82
Central Tractor Farm and Country, Inc, with 232 stores, operated
within the same retail market.83 Both companies were profitable on
their own. 84
Quality and the CT Parties entered into a merger agreement that
paid Quality's shareholders in cash and stock for their equity inter-
76. Sabino, supra note 35, at 39.
77. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 105 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D.
Colo 1989), rev'd, 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo 1990), affd sub nom. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles
Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. ex rel. Raleigh v. Schotten-
stein (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 131 B.R. 655, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
78. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI Ill), 571 F.3d 545, 547 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al. at 5-6, QSI III, 571 F.3d 545 (No. 08-1176),
2008 WL 4570172; Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R.
629, 631 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006).
82. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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ests,85 as is typical of any LBO. The total purchase price was approxi-
mately $208 million, with the shareholders to receive $111.5 million in
cash and $91.8 million in stock.86 The CT Parties also agreed to as-
sume and pay $42.1 million of Quality's existing debt.87 Of interest
was the fact that some of Quality's employees were shareholders
through the company's Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT).88
The assets of the merged entity, named Quality Stores, Inc.,89 were
pledged as collateral to a bank syndicate 90 that financed the merger.91
To complete the transaction, the CT Parties enlisted the help of
HSBC Bank USA (HSBC) to act as an exchange agent. 92 The CT
Parties entrusted HSBC with the $111.5 million in cash, and HSBC
collected the shares of Quality Stock, paying each of them in turn.93
HSBC then transferred the securities to the CT Parties.94 This simple
use of a financial institution was crucial to the case's outcome. 95
When the deal closed in March 1999,96 the new company imple-
mented a costly expansion plan to open twenty-five to fifty new retail
stores a year.97 It remained in business for two and a half more years,
until October 2001.98 The decision to expand, and presumably the
company's high debt load, led to "severe financial and liquidity
problems," 99 which in turn caused a group of creditors, including some
of the banks who were part of the syndicate that originally funded the
LBO, to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.1°° The debtor volun-
tarily filed for Chapter 11 relief shortly thereafter. 10 1
85. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 631.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CT Holdings changed its name to QSI Holdings, Inc. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R.
Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11.
90. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11.
91. Corrected Opening Brief of Appellants at 6, QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI 1), 382
B.R. 731 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (No. 1:06-cv-876), 2007 WL 1369910.
92. QSI I, 355 B.R. at 632.
93. Id.
94. Id. Note that the ESOT shareholders had an additional step because a trustee, LaSalle
Bank, held most of the ESOT stock. LaSalle tendered the shares to HSBC, receiving cash in
return, which LaSalle then distributed to the ESOT shareholders. Id.
95. Id. at 631 ("[Tjhe legal issue presented is whether the transfers from the disbursing agent
to the Defendants are exempt from avoidance because they constitute 'settlement payments'
made by a 'financial institution' under § 546(e).").
96. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11.
97. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 632.
98. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11.
99. Corrected Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 91, at 7.
100. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11.
101. Corrected Opening Brief of Appellants, supra 91, at 7.
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1. QSI's Arguments and Reasoning
Two years after filing, the debtor sought to avoid the merger trans-
action and recover the funds paid to Quality's shareholders. 0 2 The
defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that the LBO
transfers were settlement payments made by a financial institution
and therefore exempt from avoidance under § 546(e). 10 3
As with this paper's thesis,10 4 each argument about the applicability
of § 546(e) to failed LBOs generally revolves around three issues:
plain meaning, congressional intent, and policy. The same is true with
the arguments and analysis in the three QSI opinions.10 5
102. Final Brief of Appellees Joan R. Gowell, et al., supra note 81, at 11. It sought to avoid
and recover the LBO transfers as constructively fraudulent under §§ 544, 550 and the Michigan
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 632. See also supra Part II.B (description
of §§ 544, 550 and its relationship to state fraudulent transfer laws).
103. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 632. Note that this case was decided under the pre-BAPCPA amend-
ments to the Code because it was initiated in 2001. Id. at 631 n.1. This had two notable effects.
First, the version of § 548 effective at that time only had a one-year reach back, therefore making
it unavailable. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 2005). Second, there were differences between the old
and new versions of § 546(e). See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (West 2010); 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (West
2006). The most current version became effective December 12, 2006. 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e)
(West 2010). The text of the version effective between December 11, 2006, and June 19, 1998
read as follows:
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the
trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section 101,
741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this
title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, fi-
nancial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, that is made
before the commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (West 2006). The text of the current version reads as follows:
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the
trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section 101,
741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this
title, made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing
agency, or that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit o) a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or se-
curities clearing agency, in connection with a securities contract, as defined in section
741(7), commodity contract, as defined in section 761(4), or forward contract, that is
made before the commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this
title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (West 2010) (new language in italics). These differences are largely unim-
portant for the purposes of this paper, however, one ramification relating to congressional intent
will be discussed infra Part III.B.2.
104. See supra Part I.
105. See Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R. 629
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI I1), 382 B.R. 731 (W.D. Mich.
2007); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI 111), 571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
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a. Plain Meaning
The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Sixth Circuit each
framed the issue in QSI within the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage.10 6 Section 546(e) currently states that "the trustee may not
avoid a transfer that is a... settlement payment, as defined in section
101 or 741 of this title, made by or to (or for the benefit of) a ...
financial institution ... that is made before the commencement of the
case .... "o107 The § 101(51A) definition of "settlement payment" ap-
plies to forward contract provisions and is inapplicable here, 10 8 so that
leaves the definition in § 741.
i. The Definition of "Settlement Payment"
Section 741(8) defines "settlement payment" as a "a preliminary
settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settle-
ment payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement
payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securi-
ties trade."'1 9 Each QSI court recognized that this definition is both
"'somewhat circular,' "110 and "'extremely broad.' "1u The courts lift
this interpretation from a particularly influential Tenth Circuit case,
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., which involved publicly
traded securities." 2 As noted by the QSI bankruptcy court, 1 3 Kaiser
reasoned that the breadth of the definition of settlement payment in-
cluded any sort of transfer considered a settlement payment in the
106. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 631 ("[W]hether the transfers from the disbursing agent to the De-
fendants are exempt from avoidance because they constitute 'settlement payments' made by a
'financial institution' under § 546(e)."); QSI H, 382 B.R. at 737 ("[W]hether the term 'settlement
payment' as defined exempts the payments made in the LBO of Quality Stores, Inc., to acquire
the privately held shares of stock."); QSI I1, 571 F.3d at 549 ("[W]hether payments made to
purchase non-public securities in a leveraged buyout can be exempted from avoidance pursuant
to section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code by merely funneling [them through] a financial
institution.").
107. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). The language of § 546(e) applied in QSI was slightly different.
See supra note 103. These slight differences have no effect on the present discussion.
108. QSI II, 382 B.R. at 737 n.4; 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A) (2006) ("[S]ettlement payment' means,
for purposes of the forward contract provisions of this title .... ").
109. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006). Note that the § 741(8) definition of settlement payment was
unchanged by BAPCPA. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 741(8) (West 2006).
110. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 633; QS1 II, 382 B.R. at 740; QSI III, 571 F.3d at 549.
111. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 633; QSI II, 382 B.R. at 740; QSI I1, 571 F.3d at 549.
112. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The
definition in section 741(8), while somewhat circular, is 'extremely broad,' in that it clearly in-
cludes anything which may be considered a settlement payment.") (citation omitted) (quoting In
re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. (Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt.
Corp. v. Spencer Sav. & Loan Ass'n), 878 F.2d 742, 751 (3d Cir. 1989)). More will be said about
Bevill below in the Analysis section. See infra Part III.A.l.b.
113. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 633-34.
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securities industry.114 And because a "[s]ettlement is 'the completion
of a securities transaction,"' Kaiser held that the term settlement pay-
ment includes a securities transfer that occurs in an LBO. 115 The
Sixth Circuit agreed, noting that "the critical phrase in the definition
[of settlement payment] is the final one: the payment must be one
'commonly used in the securities trade.'"H 6 This was meant "'as a
catchall phrase intended to underscore the breadth of the § 546(e) ex-
emption."' 117 Each QSI court therefore determined, as did Kaiser,
that the definition of settlement payment is broad enough to include
LBO securities transfers.11 8
ii. Public versus Private LBOs
That broad definition of settlement payment led directly to the
question of whether it is also broad enough to include a private securi-
ties transaction."l 9 Here again, arguments in favor of the statute's
supposed plain meaning won. As the district court stated, "[N]othing
in the plain language of the statutes limits the application of the ex-
emption to public transactions.' 120 The Sixth Circuit agreed, stating
that "nothing in the text of § 546(e) precludes its application to settle-
ment payments involving privately held securities."' 21 The breadth of
§ 546(e) and the § 741(8) definition of settlement payment made this
result possible. As the district court noted, "[mierely because the stat-
utory definition is broad does not render it ambiguous."' 22
iii. Absurd Results?
Would such a broad reading of "settlement payment" lead to a re-
sult sufficiently absurd to warrant not enforcing its plain meaning? 23
The Sixth Circuit never answered this question directly, and the bank-
ruptcy court did not consider it except to conclude that "the plain lan-
114. Kaiser Steel, 913 F.2d at 848.
115. Id at 849. ("[Ilnterpreting 'settlement payment' to include the transfer of consideration in
an LBO is consistent with the way 'settlement' is defined in the securities industry.").
116. QSI I11, 571 F.3d at 549 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006)).
117. Id. at 550 (quoting Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir.
2009)).
118. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634; QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI I), 382 B.R. 731, 740-41 (W.D.
Mich. 2007); QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 549 (6th Cir. 2009).
119. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634; QSI 11 (W.D. Mich.), 382 B.R. at 741; QSI I1, 571 F.3d at 549.
120. QSI I1, 382 B.R. at 741.
121. QS! III, 571 F.3d at 550.
122. QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 741.
123. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 633 ("'When the language is clear, no further inquiry is necessary
unless applying the plain language leads to an absurd result."') (quoting Lowenschuss v. Resorts
Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir. 1999)); QSI II, 382 B.R. at 739;
QSI I1, 571 F.3d at 549.
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guage of § 546(e) does not lead to an unjust or absurd result."'1 24 The
district court, on the other hand, considered the question in detail. 125
It determined that the breadth of the statutory definition "leaves to
the courts the task of winnowing out those transactions that do not
comport with the statutory provisions or congressional intent and thus
lead to an absurd result. ' 126 However, the district court ultimately
ruled that the equities were on the side of Quality's shareholders,
"many of whom are mid- and lower-level ESOT employee-sharehold-
ers, whose stock payments would be voided in favor of the credi-
tors."'1 27 Therefore, there were no absurd results.128
iv. "Financial Institution"
Another plain-meaning argument considered was based on the
§ 546(e) requirement that the settlement payment be made by a "fi-
nancial institution.' 1 29 All three courts considered the argument that
the transfers were not made by a financial institution because the dis-
bursing agent, HSBC, never had a beneficial interest in the LBO con-
sideration.130 If HSBC never had dominion or control over the funds
it disbursed, then the courts could have ruled that it was nothing more
than an intermediary or a conduit and that the CT Parties made the
transfer, not the financial institution HSBC. 13 1 In essence, plaintiffs
argued that, as is required by § 550, HSBC was not a "transferee" in
the LBO transaction. 132 All three courts found this unpersuasive be-
cause the language of § 546(e) contains no requirement that a finan-
cial institution acquire a beneficial interest in the funds it handles. 133
HSBC may have been an intermediary and a conduit, but nowhere
does it state that such a role is impermissible-the courts ruled that it
was still a transfer by a financial institution as § 546(e) requires.
124. QSI I, 355 B.R. at 634-35.
125. QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 741-42.
126. Id. at 741.
127. Id. at 742.
128. Id.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). The plaintiffs conceded that HSBC was a financial institution.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010) (No.
09-439), 2009 WL 3308849.
130. Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R. 629, 635
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QS 11), 382 B.R. 731, 742 (W.D. Mich.
2007); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI 111), 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
131. QSI I, 355 B.R. at 635; QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 742; QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 550-51.
132. QSI Ill, 571 F.3d at 551; 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006).
133. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634; QSI H, 382 B.R. at 742; QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 551.
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b. Congressional Intent
Each QSI court also considered Congress's intent.1 34 They rea-
soned that the broad definition of settlement payment furthered a pol-
icy of protecting securities markets from harm that might occur if
bankruptcy trustees have the power to unwind settled securities trans-
actions.135 Congress could have addressed the breadth of § 546(e) and
the definition of settlement payment, but it has not done S0.136 In-
stead, Congress chose statutory language that was inclusive, leaving it
to the courts to winnow out transactions that lead to absurd results.137
Furthermore, as the Sixth Circuit stated, "[N]othing in the statutory
language indicates that Congress sought to limit that protection to
publicly traded securities.' 1 38 Each court therefore felt that it was
Congress's intent to protect securities markets from the harm that
would result if LBOs could be unwound years after they occurred. 139
As the Sixth Circuit stated, "The value of the privately held securities
at issue is substantial and there is no reason to think that unwinding
that settlement would have any less of an impact on financial markets
than publicly traded securities. ' 140 However, the truth of this state-
ment is far from certain.
c. Policy
Policy considerations of fairness and the potential for abuse particu-
larly troubled the bankruptcy court.141 Judge Gregg noted that, "Al-
though the result in... this adversary proceeding may seem 'unfair,' it
is not 'unjust' given the language of the Bankruptcy Code.' 1 42 The
law as he applied it permits transferees to make what would otherwise
be fraudulent LBO transactions, thereby opening up the possibilities
of abuse. 143 Judge Gregg sounded particularly conflicted when he
wrote the following: "As a voice from the rivers and forests of Michi-
gan, this judge hopes that Congress will reassess § 546(e)."'144 The dis-
134. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634; QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 741-42; QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 550-51.
135. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634; QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 741-42; QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 550.
136. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634.
137. QSI H, 382 B.R. at 741.
138. QSI Il, 571 F.3d at 550.
139. QSI H, 382 B.R. at 743 (citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 1991)); QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634-35; QSI III, 571 F.3d at 550.
140. QSI I1, 571 F.3d at 550.
141. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 634.
142. Id. at 635 n.5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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trict court and Sixth Circuit showed no similar concerns that an
"unfair" result was reached. 145
2. QSI's Holding
The bankruptcy court held that the LBO payments made to the
Quality shareholders were settlement payments made by a financial
institution under § 546(e). 146 Therefore, they were not subject to
avoidance as constructively fraudulent transfers.147 It then enforced
the summary judgment on all parties sua sponte-even on the non-
moving parties-because § 546(e) applied to all defendants equally. 148
The district court agreed, finding no basis for reversal of the grant of
summary judgment. 149 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 50
noting that "§ 546(e) is not limited to publicly traded securities but
also extends to transactions, such as the leveraged buyout at issue
here, involving privately held securities.' 151 The Supreme Court de-
nied a writ of certiorari on January 19, 2010.152 As one commentator
noted, "The main lesson to be learned from Quality Stores is that pro-
ceeds from an LBO should be 'funneled' through a financial institu-
tion as a 'settlement payment' to increase the possibility the payments
will be shielded from fraudulent transfer scrutiny."'1 53
III. ANALYSIS
Did the Sixth Circuit and its two lower courts make the right deci-
sion in QSI? When considering whether § 546(e) should properly be
applied to LBOs of privately held companies, three questions arise:
(1) Is the result justified by the statutory language? (2) Is it justified
by congressional intent? And, (3) is it good public policy? Applying
§ 546(e) to the LBOs of private companies may be justified by the
statutory language and congressional intent. However, it is a close
question, and the better conclusion is that they are both ambiguous.
Furthermore, it is not good public policy. Congress's policy may be
sound when applied to publicly traded securities, but it loses its ratio-
nale and purpose when applied to privately traded securities.
145. Id.; QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI 11), 382 B.R. 731, 742 (W.D. Mich. 2007); QSI III,
571 F.3d at 550.
146. QSI 1, 355 B.R. at 636.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. QSI 1I, 382 B.R. at 743.
150. QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 551.
151. Id. at 547.
152. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
153. Hesse, supra note 22, at 23.
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A. Plain Meaning?
Does the statutory language justify applying § 546(e) to LBOs of
private companies? Courts are decidedly split on this question, but
the plain meaning of § 546(e) cannot definitively justify applying it to
LBOs of private companies. The text of section 546(e) reads as
follows: 15 4
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and
548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a
margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title,
or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title,
made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial par-
ticipant, or securities clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by
or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or
securities clearing agency, in connection with a securities contract,
as defined in section 741(7), commodity contract, as defined in sec-
tion 761(4), or forward contract, that is made before the commence-
ment of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.155
As it applies to an LBO, the key language in § 546(e) is that the trus-
tee may not avoid a transfer that is a "settlement payment" made "by
or to" a "financial institution," except under § 548(a)(1)(A). 156 One
court recognized three conditions for the § 546(e) defense to apply.'5 7
First, the prepetition transfer must be a settlement payment; second,
the transfer must be made by or to a financial institution; and third,
the transfer must not be made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud. 158
1. "Settlement Payment"
The definition of settlement payment is crucial to § 546(e). There
are two statutory definitions of settlement payment-§ 101(51A) and
§ 741(8)-but § 741(8) applies to LBO transactions.159  Section
101(51A)'s definition only applies to forward contracts. 160 Section
154. The task of statutory analysis "begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the lan-
guage of the statute itself." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
156. Id.
157. Loranger Mfg. Corp. v. PNC Bank (In re Loranger Mfg. Corp.), 324 B.R. 575,
583 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005).
158. Id. Note that no other case has so explicitly recognized these elements.
159. Thomas G. Kelch, Forward Contracts, Bankruptcy Safe Harbors and the Electricity Indus-
try, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 101 (2005).
160. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI I1), 382 B.R. 731, 737 n.4 (W.D. Mich. 2007) ("The
definition of § 101(51A) applies to forward contract provisions under the Bankruptcy Code and
is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case."). It is noteworthy that § 101(51A) is consid-
[Vol. 9:471
2011] § 546(e) AND LBOs OF PRIVATE COMPANIES
741(8) states: "'[S]ettlement payment' means a preliminary settlement
payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement pay-
ment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, or
any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade
"161
Courts have stated that this definition is "circular and cryptic,"'162
"as opaque as it is circular,"'1 63 and that "[e]ssentially, it provides that
a settlement payment is a settlement payment. ' 164 The only thing that
saves the definition from being a "meaningless tautology"'165 is its con-
cluding phrase: "or any other similar payment commonly used in the
securities trade. 1' 66 Therefore, the next question is what is a settle-
ment payment as commonly used in the securities trade? To answer
that, one must know something about settlement in the securities
trade.
a. The Clearance and Settlement System
"Clearance and settlement" refers to a national system established
by the Securities and Exchange Commission 67 where parties agree on
the terms of a securities trade and then arrange for the delivery and
payment required by that trade. 68 After any securities trade is exe-
cuted, a trade comparison is done whereby buyers and sellers (broker-
dealers) agree on terms and confirm that a contract exists.169 Trade
ered broader than § 741(8) because it includes "net settlement payments," which are not a part
of § 741(8). Kelch, supra note 159, at 101. For a case defining "forward contract" see Hutson v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (In re National Gas Distrib.), 556 F.3d 247, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
For a case defining "settlement payment" in relation to a forward contract see Olympic Natural
Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (In re Olympic Natural Gas Co.), 294 F.3d 737,
742 (5th Cir. 2002).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006). Section 101(51A) reads as follows:
The term "settlement payment" means, for purposes of the forward contract provisions
of this title, a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim
settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, a
net settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the forward
contract trade.
Id. § 101(51A).
162. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 675 (D.R.I. 1998).
163. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195 B.R. 971, 983 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996).
164. Zahn, 218 B.R. at 675.
165. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.),
367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006).
167. Neil M. Garfinkel, No Way Out: Section 546(e) is No Escape for the Public Shareholder
of a Failed LBO, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51, 63-64 (1991).
168. Richard C. Strasser, Issues in Securities Regulation, 2 J. oF BANKR. L. & PRAC. 436, 438
(1993).
169. Id.
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comparison is generally the responsibility of the marketplace where
the trade occurs. 170 Next, most trades clear through a continuous net
settlement accounting system under which the clearing agency 171 nets
each member's sales and purchases to arrive at a daily net deliver or
receive obligation and a daily net settlement payment obligation.
172
Finally, clearing members settle their net obligations with the clearing
agency.173 "[Tihe trades are settled" when funds and securities are
delivered in satisfaction of the obligations. 174 This final settlement can
take place up to three days after the date of the trade. 175
Partly because of this delay between when a trade takes place and
when it is settled, it is critical to the system's success that all obliga-
tions are guaranteed.' 7 6 Buyers make guarantees, sellers make guar-
antees, and at the same time, the clearing agency guarantees the
obligations of them both in case either (or both) defaults. 177 This sys-
tem insures against the risk that a clearing member will default on its
obligations. 178 However, when securities markets experience extreme
volatility or when a member declares bankruptcy there is a risk that
the failure of one clearing member could cause a ripple effect that
forces other clearing members to default, thereby threatening the in-
tegrity of the entire system.179 Part of section 546(e)'s purpose is to
help ensure this system's stability by protecting such transactions from
the Code's preference and fraudulent transfer provisions. 80
b. Influential Cases that Define Settlement Payment
This system only relates to publicly traded securities. Where a se-
curities transaction is entirely private, such as in an LBO of a privately
held company (where a bank acts as an agent to collect securities and
distribute cash to securities holders), it is difficult to see how the pur-
pose of protecting the national clearance and settlement system has
any relationship to that LBO. 181 On the other hand, if the view is
170. Id.
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(48).
172. Strasser, supra note 168.
173. Id.
174. Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 64.
175. About Settling Trades in Three Days: T+3, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
tplus3.htm (last modified May 21, 2004).
176. Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 64.
177. Id. at 64-65; Strasser, supra note 168, at 438.
178. Strasser, supra note 168, at 438.
179. Id. at 438-39; Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 65.
180. Strasser, supra note 168, at 439.
181. In fact, as many cases do, it is entirely possible to conclude that because there is no
relationship between the purpose of protecting this clearance and settlement system, § 546(e)
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taken that settlement payments are merely payments that complete or
conclude a transaction, 182 as the statute suggests, 183 then the purpose
behind the law is irrelevant as long as that interpretation accords with
the Code's plain meaning. The Tenth Circuit considered this interpre-
tive riddle in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co,1 84 which was one
in a series of cases185 that were the first to apply § 546(e) to shield an
LBO from fraudulent conveyance law,186 albeit in relation to a pub-
licly traded company. 87
The transfers in Kaiser were typical for any LBO: a private group of
outside investors purchased all outstanding shares of Kaiser Steel's
publicly traded stock paying, in part, with a bank loan secured by the
corporation's assets.1 88 The stock was collected by a disbursing agent,
Bank of America (a "financial institution"), and the shareholders
were each paid.1 89 When Kaiser filed a Chapter 11 petition approxi-
mately three years later, it commenced a fraudulent-conveyance ac-
tion to avoid the LBO and recover the shareholders' payouts.1 90 The
issue before the court was whether the consideration paid to share-
should therefore not apply to private securities transactions. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.), 367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that because the transfer in question did not involve "publicly traded
securities or otherwise implicate the public securities markets, the transfer is not a 'settlement
payment' within the meaning of § 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code"). This will be considered in
more detail below. See infra Part III.B.
182. Kelch, supra note 159, at 96. Note that cases have held that a "settlement payment"
includes partial and interim settlement payments as well. Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re
Comark), 971 F.2d 322, 325-26 (9th Cir 1992) (defining settlement payment as "any transfers
that occur during the settlement process"); Wyle v. Howard (In re Hamilton Taft & Co.), 176
B.R. 895, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995), alffd, 114 F.3d 991 (1997) (holding that settlement pay-
ment "includes any transfer of cash or securities toward completion of a securities transaction").
This fits within the plain meaning of § 741(8), which includes the words, "a preliminary settle-
ment payment, a partial settlement payment, [and] an interim settlement payment." 11 U.S.C.
§ 741(8) (LexisNexis 2011).
183. 11 U.S.C. 741(8) (2006) ("a final settlement payment").
184. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230 (10th
Cir. 1991).
185. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.) 105 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1989), rev'd, 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo 1990), affd sub nom. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab &
Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1991). See also supra note 112.
186. Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 60-61 ("This defense was one of first impression. To the
circuit court's knowledge, no one had ever attempted to apply section 546(e) to an LBO.").
187. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1990).
188. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1235
(10th Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 1235-36.
190. Id. at 1236.
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holders was exempt from avoidance under § 546(e) as settlement
payments.19'
In defining settlement payment, the court first noted that the defini-
tion attempts to "encompass all 'settlement payments' commonly used
in the securities trade.' 92 With the acknowledgement that what is
"commonly used in the securities trade" is key language, the court
considered the nature and procedures of the national clearance and
settlement system.193 It identified two specific types of settlement
payments: "street-side settlements," which take place within the clear-
ance and settlement system between brokers and the clearing agency,
and "customer-side settlements," which occur between brokers and
their customers.194 The original purpose behind § 546(e)'s enactment
may have been to protect street-side settlements between brokers and
the clearing agency, but as the Kaiser court recognized, Congress used
no such language to exclude customer-side settlements. 95 Addition-
ally, § 741(8) applies to settlement payments made in repurchase
agreements, which are not trades on an exchange and which involve
an entirely different settlement process.196 This indicates that there is
not necessarily a link between what a settlement payment is and the
clearance and settlement system, although there is a policy link.
The plain meaning of the statute therefore suggests no clear intent
to limit the definition to a street-side settlement strictly within the
clearing and settlement system. As the Kaiser court noted, "While the
leveraged buy out may not be a 'routine' securities trade ... we can-
not deny what in substance took place here. The LBO was a securities
transaction, varying only in form from the various other ways in which
a shareholder's equity interest can be sold.' 97 In other words, a se-
curity may be sold in numerous ways. In each way it is sold, it will
inevitably include a settlement payment, because a settlement pay-
ment is nothing more than "'the completion of a securities transac-
tion."' 198 Therefore, whenever a security is sold, regardless of the
manner in which it is sold, that transfer results in a settlement pay-
ment, and that in turn shields it from avoidance by § 546(e). It is no
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1237.
193. In re Kaiser Steel, 952 F.2d at 1235, 1237-38; see also supra Part III.A.l.a.
194. In re Kaiser Steel, 952 F.2d at 1237-38.
195. Id. at 1239.
196. Id. See infra note 260.
197. Id. at 1239-40.
198. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
ALLEN H. PESSIN & JOSEPH A. Ross, WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 INVESTMENT TERMS DE-
FINED 227 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1983)).
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wonder, then, that the Tenth Circuit found that the definition of settle-
ment payment is "'extremely broad."' 199
But what of the case that the Tenth Circuit relied on to determine
that the definition of settlement payment is extremely broad? This
case, Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp. v. Spencer
Savings & Loan Association,200 has also turned out to be an extremely
influential case in the battle between LBOs and fraudulent convey-
ance law 20 ' because it discusses some of the legislative history behind
§ 546(e) and the definition of settlement payment.20 2
199. Id. at 848 (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. (Bevill, Bresler
& Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer Say. & Loan Ass'n), 878 F.2d 742, 751 (3d Cir.
1989)).
200. Kaiser also relied on Blanton v. Prudential-Bache Securities (In re Blanton), 105 B.R. 321
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), but that case has proved much less influential in cases applying § 546(e)
to LBOs. William C. Rand, In Re Kaiser Steel Corporation: Does Section 546(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code Apply to a Fraudulent Conveyance Made in the Form of an LBO Payment?, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 87, 97 (1991) ("The Tenth Circuit in Kaiser relied on both In re Blanton and
In re Bevill to extend a broad definition of 'settlement payment' to the equity securities
markets.").
201. In re Bevill, 878 F.2d at 751. Bevill has been cited by nearly every major case considering
the definition of settlement payment and whether § 546(e) shields LBOs from fraudulent trans-
fer law. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230,1237 (10th Cir.
1991); Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Comark), 971 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1992); Lowen-
schuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir. 1999); In re QSI
Holdings, Inc. (QSI 111), 571 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2009); Jonas v. Farmer Bros. Co. (In re
Comark), 145 B.R. 47, 49 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992); Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Graf-
ton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527, 535 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005); Kaiser Steel Res. Inc. v. Jacobs (In
re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514, 522 (D. Colo. 1990); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. ex rel. Raleigh v.
Schottenstein (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 131 B.R. 655, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1991): Jewel Recovery,
L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 353 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Jackson v. Mishkin (In re
Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 263 B.R. 406, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors v. Fleet Retail Fin. Grp. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 274 B.R. 71, 85 (D.
Del. 2002); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Clark (In re Nat'l Forge Co.), 344 B.R.
340, 352 (W.D. Pa. 2006); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, 382 B.R. 731, 736 (W.D. Mich. 2007);
Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (In re Enron Creditors Recovery
Corp.), 422 B.R. 423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.)
105 B.R. 639, 651 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989), rev'd, 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo. 1990), affd sub nom.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990); Jonas v. Farmer Bros.
(In re Comark), 124 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Wertheim
Schroder & Co. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.), 161 B.R. 87, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Brandt
v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195 B.R. 971, 983 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996);
Mishkin v. Ensminger (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 218 B.R. 689, 703 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re the It Group, Inc., 359 B.R. 97, 100 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.), 367 B.R. 68, 75 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2007); Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 366 B.R. 318, 323
(Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
202. In re Bevill, 878 F.2d at 747.
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c. The Legislative History of Settlement Payment
Although Bevill dealt with § 546(f) 203 in a repurchase-agreement
transaction,20 4 to interpret § 546(f) the court had to delve into the leg-
islative history of § 546(e), which was a precursor to that section. 20 5
When Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1982 to create
§ 546(e), 20 6 it was "concerned about the volatile nature of the com-
modities and securities markets, and decided that certain protections
were necessary to prevent 'the insolvency of one commodity or secur-
ity firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the
collapse of the affected market."' 20 7 As Congress stated, part of its
purpose was "intended to minimize the displacement caused in the
commodities and securities markets in the event of a major bank-
ruptcy affecting those industries. 2 0 8 The 1982 legislative changes to
203. Section 546(f) is very similar to § 546(e). Where § 546(e) prevents avoidance of margin
payments or settlement payments by or to a commodity broker, forward contract merchant,
stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant or securities clearing agency, § 546(f) pre-
vents avoidance of margin payments or settlement payments made by or to a repo participant in
connection with a repurchase agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)-(f) (2006). They both use the term
settlement payment. Id.
204. A repurchase agreement, otherwise known as a repo, is a "short-term loan agreement by
which one party sells a security to another party but promises to buy back the security on a
specified date at a specified price." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1419 (9th ed. 2009). The
Comark court elaborates as follows:
In a Repo arrangement, the dealer sells specified securities to a purchaser, but also
agrees to repurchase the securities later at the original price, plus an agreed upon addi-
tional amount usually representing interest on the original purchase price. A Reverse
Repo basically is the reverse: the dealer buys securities and agrees to resell the securi-
ties to the seller in the future. Reverse Repos can function as a loan. The seller re-
ceives cash for the securities, but must repurchase the securities in the future at the
same price. Thus, the securities "sold" to the dealer can be viewed as being collateral
for a loan.
In re Comark, 971 F.2d at 323 (citation omitted). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(46)-(47).
205. In re Bevill, 878 F.2d at 747.
206. Section 546(d), which later became the current § 546(e), originated with § 764(c), which
was repealed. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585, 1982
WL 25042. The Comark court noted, "Section 546(e) was enacted originally as § 546(d) in 1982
by Public Law No. 97-222. In 1984, this provision [§ 546(d)] was redesignated as section 546(e)."
In re Comark, 145 B.R. at 51 n.10. Neil M. Garfinkel explains further:
Section 546(e) has its origins in a 1975 New York district court case, Seligson v. New
York Produce Exchange, [394 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)] in which the court refused
to find that a 12 million dollar margin payment made by a bankrupt commodities bro-
ker was exempt from the avoiding powers of the broker's trustee in bankruptcy. In
response to Seligson, Congress incorporated section 764(c) into the new Bankruptcy
Code, intending to provide protection from the types of claims represented by Seligson.
Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 61 (citations omitted). See also Rand, supra note 200, at 102.
207. In re Bevill, 878 F.2d at 747 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583, 1982 WL 25042).
208. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583, 1982 WL
25042.
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"broaden the commodities market protections and expressly extend
similar protections to the securities market" 20 9 was consistent with the
policy behind parts of the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code to
protect the commodities market and insure its stability.210
With that background in mind, the Bevill court examined the defini-
tion of settlement payment, which it reasoned is "extremely broad. 211
This, the court noted, was consistent with Congress's intention that a
settlement payment should include the purchaser paying for the secur-
ities as well as the transfer of the securities by the dealer.212 In addi-
tion, settlement payment "includes transfers which are normally
regarded as part of the settlement process, whether they occur on the
trade date, the scheduled settlement day, or any other date in the set-
tlement process for the particular type of transaction at hand. '213
In actuality, other than concluding that the definition of settlement
payment is extremely broad based on a statement of policy in the leg-
islative history, Bevill has no relationship to § 546(e) or LBOs. 214 One
commentator in particular has recognized this and criticized the Kai-
ser court for relying so heavily on Bevill.21 5 Another commentator
criticized a broad reading of settlement payment based on § 546(e)'s
legislative history, stating, "Section 546(e)'s legislative history . . . is
hardly dispositive as to whether payments to selling shareholders may
be settlement payments. '216 Both of these criticisms are correct.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2.
211. In re Bevill, 878 F.2d at 749, 751.
212. Id. at 752.
213. Id.
214. See generally id. See also Beckerman & Stark, supra note 31 ("[Section] 546(e) does not,
on its face, suggest Congress intended to immunize cashed out shareholders from a fraudulent
conveyance attack. Nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress had such intention.");
Rand, supra note 200, at 92-93 ("The Kaiser decision unfairly relied on the persuasive authority
of the In re Blanton and In re Bevill decisions. These cases involved different markets and differ-
ent sections of the Bankruptcy Code.").
215. Sabino, supra note 35, at 51.
The Third Circuit in Bevill, Bessler was factually distinguishable in that the court was:
a) dealing with federal government securities "repo" agreements, not payouts to the
selling shareholders of an LBO target company; b) confronted with a defunct broker-
age, not a failed LBO under attack as a fraudulent conveyance; and c) most impor-
tantly, the Third Circuit explicitly decided its proceeding under a different exception to
the trustee's avoiding powers. The Schwab and Kaiser rationales are therefore seri-
ously misplaced in terms of the common law they both prominently relied upon.
Id.
216. Michael L. Cook, Brad J. Axelrod & Geoffrey S. Frankel, The Judicially Created "Inno-
cent Shareholder" Defense to Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Liability in Failed Leveraged
Buyouts, 43 S.C. L. REv. 777, 803 (1992).
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However, despite these and other attacks on Kaiser,217 it is conven-
tional wisdom that "§ 546(e) was enacted to protect the nation's finan-
cial markets against instability caused by the reversal of settled
securities transactions. '218 Besides giving us this general policy, the
legislative history is unhelpful in interpreting the statutory language of
§ 546(e) or the meaning of the term settlement payment. Congress
stated nothing specific about how courts should apply either § 546(e)
or § 741(8). Furthermore, the legislative history is silent on the sub-
ject of LBOs or whether § 546(e) should shield them from fraudulent
conveyance law.219
d. "Commonly Used in the Securities Trade"
Going back to the definition of settlement payment in § 741(8),220
does the phrase "commonly used in the securities trade" shine light on
whether the plain meaning of the statute justifies applying § 546(e) to
LBOs of private companies? The Sixth Circuit in QSI noted that this
is the critical phrase in the definition of settlement payment.221 It is
the only thing that keeps § 741(8) from being hopelessly circular.222
One might first assume that expert evidence could be helpful in de-
termining how settlement payment is commonly used in the securities
trade. If common usage defines the term, it seems fitting to hear ex-
pert testimony on that usage. The Tenth Circuit in Kaiser apparently
reviewed expert testimony on the record as to the meaning of settle-
ment payment, 22 3 but despite that, at least one court has properly held
that this is unnecessary.224 Courts instead treat the meaning of settle-
217. See, e.g., Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 60-61; Gerald K. Smith & Frank R. Kennedy,
Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of Current Interest, 43 S.C. L. REV. 709 (1992);
Rand, supra note 200, at 87; Jane Elizabeth Kiker, Judicial Repeal of Fraudulent Conveyance
Laws: Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990), 14 HAMLINE L.
REV. 453 (1991).
218. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2009).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 97-420 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 1982 WL 25042;
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 850 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Neither LBOs
nor other exceptional transactions were even mentioned in any of the discussions of the securi-
ties industry in the reports, debates, and hearings on the bill.").
220. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006) ("'[S]ettlement payment' means a preliminary settlement pay-
ment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on
account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securi-
ties trade ....").
221. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re OSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI 111), 571 F.3d 545, 549 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
222. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.),
367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
223. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 850 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990).
224. Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Comark), 971 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ment payment as a question of statutory interpretation. 225 Neverthe-
less, settlement payment "should be given its established meaning in
that industry. ' 22 6 It is simply that a court will make that decision, not
an expert.227
As courts have done,228 referring to a dictionary to define settle-
ment payment would seem helpful. However, the results yield only
broad generalities.229 The dictionaries the Tenth Circuit in Kaiser con-
sulted give the following definitions: "the completion of a securities
transaction";230 "'finishing up of a transaction or group of transac-
tions' ";231 "'the completion of a transaction, wherein securities and
corresponding funds are delivered and credited to the appropriate ac-
counts' ";232 ",'conclusion of a securities transaction when a customer
pays a broker/dealer for securities purchased or delivers securities
sold and receives from the broker the proceeds of a sale' ";233 and
"'transfer of the security (for the seller) or cash (for the buyer) in
order to complete a security transaction.' ,,234 Although these defini-
tions suggest limits, given their generality, it is not surprising that the
Sixth Circuit agreed that "commonly used in the securities trade" is
"'a catchall phrase intended to underscore the breadth of the § 546(e)
exemption.' -235
225. Id.; Wyle v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs Inc. (In re Hamilton Taft & Co.), 176
B.R. 895, 899 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 196 B.R. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 114 F.3d
991 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Comark).
226. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2009).
227. The key significance of this is that whether a transaction is a settlement payment may be
determined as a matter of law on summary judgment. In re Comark, 971 F.2d at 324-25.
228. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel, 913 F.2d at 849; Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re
Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1238 (10th Cir. 1991); Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Enron Credi-
tors Recovery Corp. (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.), 422 B.R. 423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
229. Kaiser Steel, 913 F.2d at 849.
230. Id. (quoting ALLEN H. PESSIN & JOSEPH A. Ross, WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 IN-
VESTMENT TERMS DEFINED 227 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1983)).
231. Id. (quoting DAVID M. BROWNSTONE & IRENE M. FRANCK, THE VNR INVESTOR'S Dic-
TIONARY 279 (1981)).
232. Id. (quoting GROUP OF THIRTY, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS 86 (1989)).
233. Id. (quoting NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LANGUAGE OF INVESTING GLOSSARY 30
(1981)).
234. Kaiser Steel, 913 F.2d at 849 (quoting DAVID L. SCorr, WALL STREET WORDS 320
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 1st ed. 1988)).
235. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI I1), 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010) (quoting Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564
F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2009)).
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While the Sixth Circuit recognized that settlement payment is
broadly defined, the court also recognized that it is limiting. 236 QSI
involved "a transaction with the characteristics of a common lever-
aged buyout involving the merger of nearly equal companies .... 237
This, it implied, is a transaction that is common in the securities
trade.238 The court contrasted that common type of LBO with the
transaction in In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.239
In Norstan, the LBO in question was of a closely held S-Corpora-
tion.240 Two individuals controlled the company. 24' One was the
president and director, controlling fifty percent of Norstan's shares,
and the other was the treasurer and secretary, controlling the other
fifty percent. 242 The Sixth Circuit in QSI contended that this LBO
"lacked many of the indicia of transactions 'commonly used in the
securities trade."' 243 Apparently, the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact
that there were only two shareholders in Norstan244 and unwinding
that transaction would not "implicate public securities markets," 245
while QSI had approximately 170 shareholders.2 46 That the number
of shareholders makes a difference is a debatable point, especially
given that both companies were privately held.247 It may not be com-
mon, but it is certainly not unheard of for closely held corporations
run by a small number of individuals to be the targets of LBOs. Is
there a qualitative difference between a company with two sharehold-
ers and a company with 170 such that will affect the plain meaning of
the statute? It is hard to see how that makes a difference to the stat-
ute's supposed plain meaning. The Sixth Circuit skirts these issues
and never explains why the transaction in QSI is common but the one
in Norstan is not.248 In fact, the court conflates several arguments
236. See id. See also KSC Recovery, Inc. v. First Boston Corp. (In re Kaiser Merger Litig.),
168 B.R. 991, 1001 (D. Colo. 1994) ("[Wlhile the definition of 'settlement payment' is broad, it is
not boundless.").
237. QSI 1i, 571 F.3d at 550.
238. Id.
239. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.),
367 B.R. 68 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
240. Id. at 73.
241. Id. at 72.
242. Id.
243. QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 550.
244. In re Norstan, 367 B.R. at 72.
245. QSI 11, 571 F.3d at 550.
246. Id. at 547.
247. In re Norstan, 367 B.R. at 73; QSI Holdings (6th Cir.), 571 F.3d at 547.
248. See generally QSI 111, 571 F.3d 545. The district court and the bankruptcy court in QSI
also neglected a discussion of how the phrase "commonly used in the securities trade" relates to
a plain meaning interpretation. See QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI 11), 382 B.R. 731 (W.D.
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throughout its short discussion, using notions of what is common in
the securities trade along with points of plain meaning and the policy
argument that the transaction in QSI could impact financial markets
just as severely as the unwinding of any publicly traded security.249
The District Court in QSI takes the discussion a bit further where it
notes that the phrase "commonly used in the securities trade" allows
courts to do a case-by-case analysis.250 In cases where abuse seems
obvious, this language allows courts to refuse to apply § 546(e) protec-
tion.251 If a transaction is illegal or somehow abusive, it can never
rightly be called common.252 Other courts have also taken this
approach. 253
In a Ninth Circuit case, In re Grafton Partners,25 4 the transaction in
question was a withdrawal of capital contributions out of a Ponzi
scheme. 255 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a "non-public
transaction in illegally unregistered securities are not 'commonly used
in the securities trade."' 256 The panel noted that the legislative history
states that "a settlement payment made by a clearing organization"
cannot be avoided "except where the transfer was made with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors and was not taken in good
faith." 257 With this background, the panel concluded that, "[i]f integ-
rity and compliance with securities laws are to be preserved ... then
trades in illegally unregistered securities must flunk the common us-
age test. '258 Grafton held that "the term 'settlement payment' implies
trades that comply with the securities laws. ' 259 Despite the apparent
soundness of this approach, Grafton has nonetheless been criticized
for looking beyond statutory language and attempting to discern con-
Mich. 2007); Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R. 629
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006).
249. QSI 111, 571 F.3d at 550.
250. QSI 11, 382 B.R. at 742.
251. Id. at 743.
252. Id.
253. Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527, 529 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 2005); John J. Monaghan, Settlement Payments in Financial Industry Transactions:
How Safe is the Harbor?, ABI FIN. & BANKING COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexan-
dria, Va.), Aug. 2007, at 381, 386, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/
financebank/vol4num2/3.pdf.
254. In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 527.
255. Id. at 529. Actual fraud under § 548(a)(1)(A) was not an issue before the B.A.P. in this
case. Id. at 532 n.5.
256. Id. at 529.
257. Id. at 538 n.20 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585, 1982 WL 25042).
258. Id. at 538.
259. In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 539.
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gressional intent.260 Such criticism seems hollow and pointlessly for-
malistic in the face of clearly illegal 61 unregistered securities.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York took
a similar approach to Grafton in two Enron cases.262 In Enron Corp.
v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (Enron 4,263 there was a series of trans-
actions where Enron redeemed over $1.1 billion of its outstanding
commercial paper.264 Enron completed these transactions less than a
month before it filed for bankruptcy.265 The court first recognized
that the phrase "commonly used in the securities trade" 266 in the defi-
nition of settlement payment saves it from "circularity" and provides
it meaning.267 With this foundation, the court considered three crucial
allegations. 268 First and most importantly as it relates to what is com-
mon in the securities trade, Enron made the payments prior to the
maturity date of the commercial paper, contrary to the terms of its
offering.269 Second, the payments were at significantly higher prices
than current market rates.2 70 Third, the commercial paper holders co-
erced Enron to pay off the paper early due to the public announce-
ments about the company being in a severe financial crisis.271 Because
the court concluded that "to qualify as a settlement payment pro-
tected by section 546(e) . . . the payment must be common in the se-
curities trade," it could not dismiss the proceedings.2 72 A trial was
required to determine the facts behind whether the transactions were
common in the securities trade.273
260. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost (In re Contemporary Indus. Corp.), No. BK98-
80382, 2007 WL 5256918, at *4 (Bankr. D. Neb. June 29, 2007).
261. The principals of the Ponzi scheme in Grafton confessed. In re Grafton Partners, 321
B.R. at 529.
262. Monaghan, supra note 253, at 386. This source explores three Enron cases, but only two
deal sufficiently with the "commonly used in the securities trade" issue to warrant discussion
here.
263. Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.) (Enron 1), 325 B.R. 671
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
264. Id. at 680.
265. The last payment was on November 6, 2001. Id. Enron declared bankruptcy on Decem-
ber 2, 2001. Kurt Eichenwald with Diana B. Henriques, Enron's Many Strands: The Company
Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted from Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, § 1.
266. 11 U.S.C. 741(8) (2006).
267. Enron 1, 325 B.R. at 685.
268. Because the court was ruling on a motion to dismiss, it was forced to accept Enron's
allegations as true. Id. at 686.
269. Id. at 685.
270. Id. at 686.
271. Id. at 686.
272. Enron I, 325 B.R. at 687.
273. Id.
[Vol. 9:471
§ 546(e) AND LBOs OF PRIVATE COMPANIES
The transaction in Enron Corp. v. International Finance Corp. (En-
ron 1/)274 was a complicated collateralized loan obligation in which
Enron and its affiliates monetized a portfolio of loan facilities and is-
sued several classes of notes.275 Because of payment defaults on the
underlying loans, the portfolio of loan facilities declined in value.276
However, due to put options277 that Enron had granted, it was forced
to purchase the outstanding notes at face value plus accrued interest,
which was significantly above current market value.278 These trans-
fers were accomplished through Chase Manhattan Bank and Bear,
Stearns 279-financial institutions.280 During the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, Enron sought to avoid these transfers as constructively fraudu-
lent under § 548(a)(1)(B). 281 The defendants filed motions to dismiss
seeking the protection of § 546(e). 282 The court followed its earlier
decisions where it determined that what is "commonly used in the se-
curities trade" is the defining phrase in the § 741(8) definition of set-
tlement payment.283  "As such, to discern whether a payment is
protected by the safe harbor provisions, a court must examine the op-
eration of trades in the securities industry. ' 284 As in Enron I, the
court thought that this was an example of Enron overpaying for some-
thing in the marketplace to protect its credit rating.285 But because
the transactions at issue here "did not involve outright illegality," as in
Grafton,286 "or transparent manipulation," as in Enron 1,287 "even if
the payments made for the purchase of the securities were above mar-
274. Enron Corp. v. Int'l Fin. Corp. (In re Enron Corp.) (Enron II), 341 BR. 451 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006).
275. Id. at 454.
276. Id.
277. A "put option" is "[ain option to sell something (esp. securities) at a fixed price even if
the market declines; the right to require another to buy." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1204 (9th
ed. 2009).
278. Enron IH, 341 B.R. at 454-55.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 458 ("The Defendants have presented excerpts from the records of various public
or quasi-public bodies establishing that . . . Bear, Stearns is a stockbroker, and that Chase is a
financial institution. All of the transactions involved transfers either to or from Chase ... and/or
Bear, Stearns.").
281. Id. at 455. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of § 548(a)(1)(B) and constructively fraud-
ulent transfer law.
282. Id.
283. Enron 1I, 341 B.R. at 457.
284. Id. at 457 (citing Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321
B.R. 527, 538 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005)).
285. Id. at 459.
286. In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 541 ("The fact that the transfer was a transaction in an
illegally unregistered security can hardly be described as a 'payment commonly used in the se-
curities trade.'").
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ket value, the facts as alleged are not sufficient to take these payments
out of the realm of settlement payments commonly used in the securi-
ties industry .... "288 Enron may have made a bad deal, the court
seemed to say, but that is nonetheless common in the securities trade
and therefore protected by § 546(e). 289
Based on these cases and others,290 an important key to the plain
meaning of the term settlement payment is a rejection of transactions
that involve "outright illegality or transparent manipulation. '291 A
transfer that is simply a bad deal may seem suspicious, but such deals
are undeniably common. However, where a transfer is contrary to
established law, calling it "common" and protecting it from avoidance
seems a clear perversion of the Bankruptcy Code.
A plain-meaning argument against this interpretation of what is
common in the securities trade is briefly recognized, but not ad-
dressed, in another Enron case, Enron Corp. v. Bear, Stearns Interna-
tional Ltd (Enron 11/).292 Section 546(e) states that "the trustee may
not avoid a transfer that is a... settlement payment ... made by or to
... a ... financial institution ... except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of
this title. '293 Thus, § 546(e) does not protect fraudulent transfers,
which are avoidable under § 548(a)(1)(A). One could interpret that
specific exclusion as an acknowledgement that fraudulent transfers
are settlement payments.294 If illegal transfers are not settlement pay-
ments and therefore not protected by § 546(e), then the language,
287. Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.) (Enron 1), 325 B.R. 671, 686
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[E]vidence must be presented on the issue of whether the Transfers
were the result of the defendants' manipulation.").
288. Enron 11, 341 B.R. at 459.
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Int'l (In re Enron Corp.), 328 B.R. 58
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (debtor's payment to acquire its own shares did not qualify as settlement
payment). Yet another Enron case dealt with this same issue. In Enron Corp. v. Bear, Stearns
Int'l Ltd. (Enron Ii), 323 B.R. 857 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), the transaction was a complicated
equity forward swap where Enron bought 323,000 shares of its own publicly traded stock from
Bear, Stearns. Id. at 860; Monaghan, supra note 253, at 386. The nearly $26 million purchase
price was paid on August 22, 2001, less than four months before Enron declared bankruptcy.
Enron III, 323 B.R. at 860; Eichenwald & Henriques, supra note 265, § 1. The issue was whether
the payment, which violated a state statute that prohibits distributions by a corporation while
insolvent on account of its stock, can be a settlement payment protected from avoidance by
§ 546. Enron III, 323 B.R. at 876. The court held that where the transaction is void under state
law, there was no securities transaction to complete and no settlement payment could result, id.
at 879, "[t]herefore, the payment could not be considered a settlement payment that qualifies for
protection from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code." Id.
291. Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527, 539 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 2005).
292. Enron 111, 323 B.R. at 877. This is the same case discussed at length in footnote 290.
293. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
294. Enron 11I, 323 B.R. at 877.
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"except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title"2 95 is superfluous.
Why list that exclusion if the definition of settlement payment already
excludes illegal transfers? This argument is too clever by half,2 96 al-
though it may appeal to a particularly formalistic, plain-meaning-ori-
ented court. The problem with this argument is that the side making it
will inevitably be defending an illegal transfer.
Getting back to LBOs, the completion of an LBO of a publicly
traded company is undoubtedly a common occurrence in the securities
trade, as the Sixth Circuit in QSI suggests. 297 As the Third Circuit
stated, "A payment for shares during an LBO is obviously a common
securities transaction . . . " and "[d]espite the fact that payments to
shareholders in an LBO are not the most common securities transac-
tion, we see no absurd result from the application of the statute's plain
language and will not disregard it.''298 But is it also true that an LBO
of a privately held company is common in the securities trade? It is
hard to see why the determination of "common in the securities
trade" depends on whether the LBO concerns a private or public
company. One may be more prevalent than the other, but both are
common transactions. If a public-company LBO is common, then a
private-company LBO may be common as well. But how common
must a transaction be for it to be common in the securities trade? This
question does not have an obvious answer.
The phrase "commonly used in the securities trade, '2 99 does not
perfectly clarify whether an LBO of a privately held company should
be excluded from § 546(e)'s protection. At best, it informs us that
where an LBO is so unusual (or so illegal) as to fall outside the
bounds of what is "normal" within the industry, only then should such
an LBO not enjoy § 546(e)'s protection. As the district court in QSI
put it, "until such time as Congress deems it prudent or necessary to
amend the statute, the courts will continue to winnow out those ex-
ceptional cases at the far end of the spectrum where the exemption is
unwarranted. ' '300 However, by the standard of the above-discussed
295. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
296. "There is something inherently distasteful about really clever lawyers overreaching." Of-
ficial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Citicorp N. Am. (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 422 B.R. 783, 864
n.51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
297. See QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI 111), 571 F.3d 545, 550
(6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
298. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir.
1999).
299. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006).
300. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI II), 382 B.R. 731, 743 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
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cases, an LBO of a privately held company appears to be just as com-
mon in the securities trade as an LBO of a publicly held company.
e. The Meaning of Settlement Payment is Ambiguous
It is now clear that the term settlement payment truly is a broad
statutory definition. If one accepts that settlement payment is broad
enough to include an LBO of a public company, then there is nothing
in the language of the statute to keep one from concluding that settle-
ment payment is also broad enough to include an LBO of a private
company. The role of the clearance and settlement system301 has con-
vinced some courts to rule that private securities do not come under
the scope of what is a settlement payment,30 2 but this overreaches.
Besides giving us the general policy that "§ 546(e) was enacted to pro-
tect the nation's financial markets against instability caused by the re-
versal of settled securities transactions, ' 30 3 the legislative history is
unhelpful. Congress stated nothing specific about how courts should
apply either § 546(e) or § 741(8), and it was silent on the topic of
LBOs or whether § 546(e) should shield them from fraudulent trans-
fer law.30 4 Neither is the phrase "commonly used in the securities
trade" 30 5 useful in finding a distinction between LBOs of public and
private companies. Courts have used that phrase to exclude certain
transactions under unusual circumstances, 306 but there is no firm au-
thority to suggest that LBOs of private companies are not just as com-
mon as LBOs of public companies. If public company LBOs are
common, and they undoubtedly are, 30 7 then private company LBOs
are probably common also.
The QSI district court correctly stated that "nothing in the plain
language of the statutes limits the application of the exemption to
public transactions. ' 30 8 Everyone who has asked that question has
searched the definition of settlement payment, and no such limiting
language exists. Furthermore, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
301. See supra Part III.A.l.a.
302. See, e.g., Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 676-77 (D.R.I. 1998); Buckley v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. Civ.A.02-CV-11497RGS, 2005 WL 1206865, at *7 (D. Mass. May 20,
2005); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (In re Grand Eagle
Cos., Inc.), 288 B.R. 484, 494-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
303. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2009).
304. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
305. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2006).
306. See supra Part III.A.l.d.
307. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir.
1999) ("A payment for shares during an LBO is obviously a common securities transaction, and
we therefore hold that it is also a settlement payment for the purposes of section 546(e).").
308. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI II), 382 B.R. 731, 741 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
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ruled that repo and forward contract transactions are shielded by
§ 546(e) without questioning whether they involve public or private
securities. 309 This brings up the otherwise only implied point that
§ 546(e) and § 741(8) apply to many types of transactions and are in
no way limited strictly to LBOs. 310 This, however, is a minor point.
The crucial factor is that no plain language limits § 546(e) to exclude
protection of LBOs of private companies. At the same time, however,
there is no specific language stating that § 546(e) should extend to
protect LBOs of private companies. Is it enough to say that just be-
cause private LBOs are not specifically excluded that it is plain that
they should be included in § 546(e)'s protection? The Sixth Circuit
has made that leap, but it is not plain. In fact, when viewed objec-
tively, § 741(8) is ambiguous. Applying § 546(e) to the LBOs of pri-
vate companies may or may not be justified by the statutory language
of the definition of what is a settlement payment. There is no clear
and plain language to make a definitive determination either way. As
the above analysis shows, any determination either way is a height-
ened form of supposition and guesswork, and reasonable observers
will naturally disagree.
2. "By or To" a "Financial Institution"
Apart from the definition of settlement payment, another plain-
meaning argument applies to the question of whether statutory lan-
guage justifies applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private companies. Sec-
tion 546(e) states that "a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a...
settlement payment ... made by or to (or for the benefit of) a com-
modity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial in-
stitution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency .... ,,31
Do the requirements that a transferee be "a commodity broker, for-
ward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial
participant, or securities clearing agency" 312 limit § 546(e)'s applicabil-
ity to LBOs of private companies? Does the plain meaning of the
phrase, "by or to (or for the benefit of)"313 also limit § 546(e)'s appli-
cability to LBOs of private companies? The answer to both of those
questions is no.
309. Id. (citing Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Comark), 971 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1992)
and Olympic Natural Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (In re Olympic Natural Gas
Co.), 294 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2002)).
310. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(e), 741(8) (2006).
311. Id. § 546(e).
312. Id.
313. Id.
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a. What is "a Commodity Broker, Forward Contract Merchant,
Stockbroker, Financial Institution, Financial Participant, or
Securities Clearing Agency"?
In considering the named parties that payment must be made by or
to for a transfer to be protected from avoidance, one immediately sees
that it applies to an incredibly broad range of the financial industry.
Section 101 defines each of the parties named in § 546(e): commodity
broker,314 forward contract merchant,315 stockbroker, 31 6 financial in-
stitution,317 financial participant,318 and securities clearing agency. 31 9
These definitions include commission merchant, foreign futures com-
mission merchant, clearing organization, leverage transaction
merchant, commodity options dealer, federal reserve bank, commer-
cial bank, savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan asso-
ciation, trust company, federally-insured credit union, receiver,
liquidating agent, investment company, and many other more detailed
financial market participants. 320 The definition of "financial institu-
tion" is a useful example:
(22) The term "financial institution" means-
(A) a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a commercial or
savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings and loan association,
trust company, federally-insured credit union, or receiver, liquidat-
ing agent, or conservator for such entity and, when any such Federal
reserve bank, receiver, liquidating agent, conservator or entity is
acting as agent or custodian for a customer (whether or not a "cus-
tomer", as defined in section 741) in connection with a securities
contract (as defined in section 741) such customer; or
(B) in connection with a securities contract (as defined in section
741) an investment company registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940.321
It is hard to imagine that any U.S. bank currently in existence would
not fit within this definition. The overwhelming breadth of this and
the other definitions means that who is or is not a party subject to
§ 546(e)'s protection is rarely a litigated issue.322 This language,
therefore, does not limit § 546(e)'s applicability to LBOs of private
companies.
314. 11 U.S.C. § 101(6) (2006).
315. Id. § 101(26).
316. Id. § 101(53A).
317. Id. § 101(22).
318. Id. § 101(22A).
319. 11 U.S.C. § 101(48).
320. Id. § 101(6), (22), (22A), (26), (48), (53A).
321. Id. § 101(22) (citation omittied).
322. This author has not found even one such case.
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b. A Beneficial Interest in the Funds
The way the "by or to" a "financial institution" language more fre-
quently comes up is best illustrated by the influential Eleventh Circuit
case, Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. 3 2 3 The transaction in
Munford was a traditional LBO of a publicly held company.324 A
group of investors, with funding from Citicorp, paid seventeen dollars
per share through a financial institution within the securities clearance
and settlement system, Citizens & Southern Trust Company.325 Thir-
teen months after the LBO, the new corporation filed for Chapter 11
protection. 326 The issue before the court was "whether the LBO pay-
ments received in exchange for shares constituted a settlement pay-
ment within the meaning of section 546(e). ' 327 Reversing the district
court's holding, 328 a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that as
a matter of first impression, § 546(e) did not protect from avoidance
the LBO payments made to the shareholders. 32 9
In so holding, the court skipped the typical discussion of the plain
meaning of settlement payment by presuming that the LBO payments
were settlement payments. 330 Instead, it focused on the "made by or
to" a "financial institution" language in § 546(e). 331 The court con-
ceded that a financial institution was involved in the transaction, but it
opined that it was "nothing more than an intermediary or conduit"
because "[t]he bank never acquired a beneficial interest in either the
funds or the shares. '332 The court reasoned that a trustee may only
avoid a transfer to a "transferee. ' 333 Because the bank never acquired
a beneficial interest in the funds it paid to shareholders, it was not a
transferee in the transaction. 334 As the court stated, "the transfers/
payments were made by Munford to shareholders. None of the enti-
ties listed in section 546(e) . . . made or received a transfer/pay-
323. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996);
See also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
324. In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 606.
325. Id. at 606-07.
326. Id. at 607.
327. Id. at 608.
328. Id. at 609.
329. In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 606.
330. Id. at 610.
331. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006); In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 610.
332. In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 610.
333. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006)).
334. Id. (citing Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196,
1200 (11th Cir. 1988) ("When banks receive money for the sole purpose of depositing it into a
customer's account ... the bank never has actual control of the funds and is not a section 550
initial transferee.")).
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ment. '' 335 Therefore, whether the payment was a settlement payment
was irrelevant. 336 The court decided that § 546(e) was not applicable
because "the LBO transaction did not involve a transfer to one of the
listed protected entities. '337 This, in turn, makes the fact of whether
or not a financial institution acquires a beneficial interest in the funds
at issue a threshold question before § 546(e) can be applied. 338
Another case decided shortly before Munford by a Massachusetts
Bankruptcy Court, In re Healthco International Inc., made a similar
decision with a fuller discussion. 339 As a way to escape a proxy con-
test, the company's stock was sold to a "white knight" 340 in an
LBO.341 This white knight was Hicks, Muse, an investment-banking
firm that specialized in LBOs. 342 Hicks, Muse paid each shareholder
fifteen dollars per share, a portion of those funds coming from secured
bank loans.343 As the court stated, the LBO left Healthco with "huge
new indebtedness," and "[a]ll those who participated in the LBO
knew, or should have known, that the transaction would leave
Healthco insolvent and with unreasonably small capital. ' 344 Just over
two years after the deal closed, Healthco filed for Chapter 11 relief.345
The Healthco court held that § 546(e) did not apply to the LBO in
question.346 It reasoned that, first, neither Healthco nor any of the
selling shareholders were the type of entities named in § 546(e). 347
Second, and more importantly, the court held that "section 546(e) ap-
plies only to a 'transfer' made by or to one of the named entities. ' 348
Citing § 550, it reasoned, "An avoided 'transfer' is recoverable only
from a 'transferee.'1"349 And a "transferee" does not include "a party
who acts only as a conduit in a transfer and acquires no beneficial
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 610.
338. Id.
339. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195 B.R. 971 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996).
340. A "white knight" is "[a] person or corporation that rescues the target of an unfriendly
corporate takeover, esp. by acquiring a controlling interest in the target corporation or by mak-
ing a competing tender offer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).
341. In re Healthco, 195 B.R. at 976.
342. Id. at 978.
343. Id. at 979.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. In re Healthco, 195 B.R. at 981.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. While § 548 makes a transfer avoidable, it is § 550 that empowers the trustee to
recover the avoided property. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006).
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interest in the property. 3 50 Again, acquiring a beneficial interest in
the property is the key here. As examples of this principle in action,
the court noted that "a bank is protected in receiving a check which is
endorsed to it but destined for its depositor's account," protection is
given to "a clearinghouse in receiving funds for a customer's account,"
and protection is given to a lawyer "receiving settlement funds which
he places in an escrow account and disburses to his client. ' 351 The
court further stated that "a party who exercises no control over the
transferred property and claims no beneficial interest in it should not
be held responsible for having received a fraudulent transfer," noting
that this is consistent with principles of agency law.352
The Healthco court seems to have missed a potentially important
point in these examples. In these situations, the law protects an other-
wise innocent party from being deemed a transferee who might be
liable. There, the law acts to protect certain parties who took part in a
transaction that a trustee might otherwise avoid. That, however, is the
same type of situation where § 546(e) applies. Section 546(e) protects
settlement payments from being avoided. 353 Just as in the above ex-
amples, it protects certain entities from being entangled within the
trustee's avoidance powers.354 The judicially created doctrines the
Healthco court cites therefore serve the same purpose § 546(e) does,
yet the court does not recognize this point.355
A more substantial criticism of cases like Healthco and Munford
was voiced in the Munford dissent.356 As Chief Judge Hatchett stated,
"I believe the majority ... chose to disregard the plain language of
section 546(e) in order to create a new exception to its application. '357
350. In re Healthco, 195 B.R. at 982.
351. Id. Note that the Healthco court also included this: "[O]f particular relevance here [is the
example of] a stockbroker who receives and disburses customer funds payable to a selling share-
holder in a leveraged buyout." Id. It then cited a particular Kaiser case: Kaiser Steel Resources,
Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514, 520-21 (D. Colo. 1990). Recall that there
were multitudes of opinions resulting from the Kaiser bankruptcy. See supra note 185 and ac-
companying text. However, the Healthco court appears to have misread this particular Kaiser
case. While Kaiser did discuss the defendant's liability as an "initial transferee" under § 550, id.
at 519-21, it went on to hold that "[elven if Schwab [the Defendant] can be considered an initial
transferee, the 'settlement payment' exception of § 546(e) should be broadly construed to cover
the payments in this case." Id. at 523. The Healthco court may not have misread Kaiser entirely,
but it at least appears to have not read it completely.
352. In re Healthco, 195 B.R. at 982.
353. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
354. See id. § 546(e).
355. See In re Healthco, 195 B.R. at 971.
356. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 614 (11th Cir.
1996) (Hatchett, C.J., dissenting in part).
357. Id.
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This has been the more influential result of Munford, as recognized by
a case from the Third Circuit, In re Resorts International, Inc.358
In Resorts, after an LBO and a subsequent bankruptcy, the debtor
sought restitution of funds transferred to a shareholder claiming that
the payment was, among other things, an avoidable transfer by a
bankrupt entity.359 The issue was whether the payment to the share-
holder was a settlement payment and therefore protected from the
application of fraudulent conveyance law by § 546(e). 360 The Resorts
court first determined that "[a] payment for shares during an LBO is
obviously a common securities transaction, and we therefore hold that
it is also a settlement payment for the purposes of § 546(e). ' 361 With
that decided, it went on to examine Munford's holding that § 546(e) is
inapplicable unless the financial institution in the transaction acquired
a beneficial interest in the funds.362 The Third Circuit rejected Mun-
ford's holding, instead deciding to follow the apparent plain meaning
of the statute.363 It stated:
The majority in Munford seems to have read into section 546(e) the
requirement that the 'commodity brokers, forward contract
merchants, stockbrokers, financial institutions, and securities clear-
ing agencies' obtain a 'beneficial interest' in the funds they handle
for the section to be applicable. This requirement is not explicit in
section 546.3 6 4
The court also made the same point about Munford's treatment of
§ 550.365 Because it found no absurd result in applying the statute's
plain language, which does not specifically require a transferee to ob-
tain an interest in the funds handled, the court held that "section 546
applies to the transaction and prevents its avoidance under section
548(a)(1)(B). ' '366 The Sixth Circuit in QSI engaged in a nearly identi-
cal analysis, and like Resorts, it rejected Munford.367 It adopted the
view that the plain meaning of the statute does not "'expressly require
that the financial institution obtain a beneficial interest in the
358. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir.
1999).
359. Id. at 508-09. The facts of this case only relate to the LBO tangentially. For a more
thorough review of these otherwise confusing facts see Thompson, supra note 10, at 1-2.
360. In re Resorts, 181 F.3d at 514.
361. Id. at 516.
362. Id. (quoting Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610
(11th Cir. 1996)).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. In re Resorts, 181 F.3d at 516 n.11.
366. Id. at 516.
367. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI 1i), 571 F.3d 545, 551 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
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funds."' 368 After the Resorts decision, Munford's reasoning has not
been accepted by any other court.369
Resorts is important not only because it rejected the reasoning in
Munford. It was the first appellate court case after Kaiser (which was
heavily criticized 370 ) to agree with Kaiser that LBO payments to
shareholders were settlement payments under § 546(e). 371 Before the
Third Circuit decided Resorts in 1999, Kaiser looked like an outlier
and the application of § 546(e) to LBOs seemed to have no future. In
part because of the Third Circuit's influence in bankruptcy cases,372
Resorts began a trend that eventually convinced many other circuit
courts, the Sixth with QSI being one of the latest.373
c. Wire Transfers
Despite its rejection, Munford nevertheless raises an interesting
point about transferees in fraudulent transfers. Under normal circum-
stances, the law will not protect an otherwise fraudulent transfer from
avoidance merely because it was accomplished by a wire transfer
through a financial institution.374 Under § 546(e), however, one court
has taken this idea to its most logical extreme holding that because
only banks can perform wire transfers, anytime a wire transfer is in-
volved, that necessarily means there is a settlement payment made by
or to a financial institution and therefore § 546(e) is applicable. This
holding is from a bankruptcy court within the Third Circuit, In re Lo-
ranger Manufacturing Corp.3 7 5
In Loranger, the transaction was a buyout of a closely held, private
company.37 6 The company itself took out a loan from PNC Bank and
used it to redeem a fifty-percent ownership share of a former officer,
director, and shareholder. 377 Faced with intentional and construc-
368. Id. (quoting Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2009)).
369. See, e.g., Contemporary Indus. Corp., 564 F.3d at 984; QSI 111, 571 F.3d 545; Brandt v.
B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
2389 (2010)).
370. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
371. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.
1999).
372. Thompson, supra note 10, at 5.
373. See supra note 9. As of April 2011, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held
that § 546(e) can be applied to shield LBOs. Only the Eleventh Circuit has ruled otherwise.
374. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr §§ 4-5, 8-9 (1984) avail-
able at http://www.law.upenn.edulblllarchives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.pdf
375. Loranger Mfg. Corp. v. PNC Bank (In re Loranger Mfg. Corp.), 324 B.R. 575 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2005).
376. Id. at 578.
377. Id. For a summary of the somewhat confusing facts of Loranger, see Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. Clark (In re Nat'l Forge Co.), 344 B.R. 340, 368 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
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tively fraudulent transfer claims, the transferee moved for dismissal
arguing that the transfers were settlement payments under § 546(e)
and therefore not subject to the trustee's avoidance powers.378
After the plaintiff conceded (apparently by mistake) 379 that the
transaction at issue was a settlement payment, the court focused on
the question of whether the payment was made by or to a financial
institution.380 It first determined that there was "no doubt" that PNC
Bank is a financial institution under the meaning of § 546(e) and that
the transaction was accomplished by a wire transfer.381 Then, follow-
ing the precedent in Resorts and brushing off arguments that "there is
no reported case that has extended the protection of section 546(e) to
a bank that merely facilitates a wire transfer, ' 382 the bankruptcy court
based its decision solely on § 546(e)'s apparent plain meaning. It held
that "[a] wire transfer was involved, and only banks ... can perform
wire transfers. Thus, the . . . payment... was a securities settlement
payment in a leveraged buyout, and it was made by .. .a financial
institution as defined in § 546(e). ' '383
The result in Loranger may border on an absurd result. Based on
Loranger's expansive view of § 546(e), "the only way payments to
shareholders pursuant to an LBO would be subject to constructive
fraudulent transfer risk is if the settlement payment was made with
cash. '38 4 Such a result appears to be an absurdity, which justifies dis-
regarding the language of the statute.38 5 The court, however, did not
see it that way386-for it, the plain meaning was clear.
d. "By or To" a "Financial Institution" Conclusion
Resorts and Loranger propose that based solely on the plain mean-
ing of the statute, there is nothing to restrict § 546(e) from being ap-
plied to the LBOs of privately held entities. As some courts have
argued with the definition of settlement payment,387 there is nothing
378. In re Loranger, 324 B.R. at 577-78.
379. Id. at 583.
380. Id. at 584.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 585.
383. In re Loranger, 324 B.R. at 585-86.
384. Gregory G. Hesse, Failed LBOs, Recovering Payments to Shareholders, LAw360 (Jan.
13, 2009), http://www.hunton.comifiles/tbl-s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2411%5CFailed_
LBOsHesseLaw360_011409.pdf.
385. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir.
1999) (seeing no absurd result from the application of the statute's plain meaning and therefore
not disregarding it).
386. In re Loranger, 324 B.R. at 585-86.
387. See supra Part III.A.l.e.
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in § 546(e)'s mandate that a settlement payment be made "by or to
(or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or
securities clearing agency" 388 that suggests excluding LBOs of private
entities. Courts have attempted to avoid this result by adding a "ben-
eficial interest" in the funds requirement, 389 but that goes beyond the
language of the statute.390 However, just because LBOs of private
entities are not specifically excluded, that does not necessarily mean
that they should be included. As was the case with the meaning of
settlement payment, the language of § 546(e) is ambiguous-it is ca-
pable of supporting two reasonable, yet opposing, conclusions. Mun-
ford's rejection may have been premature.
3. Plain Meaning Conclusion
Many courts have gone far down the road towards using plain
meaning to read § 546(e) broadly and literally. The Third Circuit in
particular has led the way. 391 Courts within that circuit have held that
even in a case that does not involve a leveraged buyout, publicly
traded stock, or involvement with a clearing agency, § 546(e) is still
broad enough to protect from avoidance a settlement payment made
by a financial institution, even where the financial institution's only
connection to the transaction is through a wire transfer. 392 With the
addition of QSI, Contemporary Industries Corp. v. Frost from the
Eighth Circuit,393 and In re Plassein International Corp. from the
Third Circuit,394 the trend is that plain-meaning arguments are being
used to decide that § 546(e) is available to shield LBOs of privately
held companies from avoidance.
388. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
389. See supra Part III.B.I. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98
F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996).
390. In re Resorts, 181 F.3d at 516; QS1 Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571
F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v.
Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2009).
391. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Acres of Diamonds (In re The It Group, Inc.),
359 B.R. 97, 101-02 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). In re The It Group characterizes In re Resorts, 181
F.3d at 515, as "concluding that the plain language of § 546(e) indicates that 'a transfer of cash or
securities [by a financial institution] made to complete a securities transaction' is a non-avoida-
ble settlement payment." See id. at 100.
392. Id. at 101-02 ("Although this case does not involve a leveraged buyout, publicly traded
stock, or a clearing agency, the Third Circuit's holding in Resorts mandates a conclusion that
section 546(e) is broad enough to protect from avoidance a 'settlement payment.., made by...
[a] financial institution.' ") (quoting In re Resorts, 181 F.3d at 515-16; 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006)).
393. Contemporary Indus. Corp., 564 F.3d 981.
394. Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2389 (2010)).
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These arguments state, first, that the term settlement payment truly
is a broad statutory definition. If one accepts that settlement payment
is broad enough to include an LBO of a public company,395 then there
is nothing in the language of the statute to keep one from concluding
that settlement payment is also broad enough to include an LBO of a
private company. Simply put, no plain language limits § 546(e) or
§ 741(8) to exclude protection of LBOs of private companies. Second,
there is nothing in § 546(e)'s mandate that a settlement payment be
made "by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial partici-
pant, or securities clearing agency" 396 that suggests excluding LBOs of
private entities. According to this view, the plain meaning of the stat-
utory language justifies applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private
companies.
The more appropriate view is that these arguments go too far. Just
because LBOs of private entities are not specifically excluded from
§ 546(e)'s protections does not make it plain that § 546(e) should be
applied to protect such private LBOs. The term "plain meaning" im-
plies that something is apparent on its face and incapable of reasona-
ble disagreement. By this standard, § 546(e) is far from plain-it is
ambiguous. One cannot definitively say one way or the other whether
it should shield LBOs of private companies.
B. Congressional Intent
We have already seen how the legislative history is unhelpful in in-
terpreting the plain meaning of § 546(e) or § 741(8). 397 Congressional
intent nonetheless plays a role in § 546(e)'s application. Does con-
gressional intent justify applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private compa-
nies? Many courts have asked this question, but any answer is a
speculative guess. A complete consideration of Congress's intent does
not definitively answer whether § 546(e) should apply to LBOs of pri-
vate companies.
An example of how some courts have used congressional intent to
specifically exclude private transactions from § 546(e) protection can
be seen in Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund.398 The transaction in Zahn
was a typical LBO of a privately held company399 funded by a loan
395. See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
396. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
397. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
398. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656 (D.R.I. 1998).
399. Id. at 676 ("[T]he stock at issue was not even publicly traded.").
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from a bank syndicate secured by the target company's assets. 40 0 Sev-
eral years later, the company filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. 40
1
The trustee, alleging that the LBO payments constituted fraudulent
transfers, contended that the LBO caused the company's
bankruptcy. 402
The issue in Zahn was whether § 546(e) exempts the transfer from
the reach of the trustee's avoidance powers.40 3 After deciding that the
§ 741(8) definition of settlement payment "defies plain meaning,' 40 4
the court went on to consider the nature of the clearance and settle-
ment system.40 5 The court concluded that discussion by noting, "The
need to preserve the stability of this system led Congress to create the
§ 546(e) exception to the trustee's avoidance powers. '40 6 It then in-
voked congressional intent stating, "Against this background, it ap-
pears unlikely that Congress intended the term 'settlement payment'
to cover the present transfers." 40 7 Relying on this congressional in-
tent, the court ruled that "the stock at issue was not even publicly
traded. The stock transfers thus had no connection whatsoever to the
clearance and settlement system, and allowing avoidance would have
no impact at all on that system. '40 8 Other courts have taken this same
position,40 9 and this argument is commonly made by parties attempt-
ing to limit § 546(e)'s application.410 Stated differently, the argument
proposes that because the transfer of privately held stock does not go
through the clearance and settlement system or implicate its guaran-
400. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund (In re Almac's, Inc.), 202 B.R. 648, 651 (D.R.I. 1996).
Zahn's facts are given in a prior opinion by the same court. Zahn, 218 B.R. at 661 ("The Court's
prior opinion provides an extensive review of the facts of this case.") (citing In re Almac's, 202
B.R. at 651-53).
401. In re Almac's, 202 B.R. at 651-52.
402. In re Almac's, 202 B.R. at 653.
403. Zahn, 218 B.R. at 675. Many other issues were discussed in Zahn, but none is relevant
here.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 675-76. See supra Part III.A.l.a for a similar discussion.
406. Id. at 676.
407. Id.
408. Zahn, 218 B.R. at 676.
409. See, e.g., Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 353 (N.D. Tex
1996) (finding that while private transaction may fit definition of "settlement payments," it
would not implicate clearance and settlement process, and thus application of § 546(e) would be
inconsistent with statutory scheme); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195
B.R. 971, 983 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (finding that one-time distribution in complete liquidation
of stock interest was "not what Congress had in mind in enacting section 546(e)," where there
was no showing of a guaranty by a securities clearing agency).
410. See, e.g., QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, 382 B.R. 731, 739 (W.D. Mich. 2007) ("Plaintiffs
argue that the § 546(e) exemption for settlement payments is limited to publicly traded securities
and that Congress did not intend to exempt transactions such as an LBO of privately held stock
.. . )
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tees, Congress could not have possibly meant for § 546(e) to shield
such private stock transfers.
The most significant problem with this argument comes from the
statute itself. The Sixth Circuit in QSI recognized this where it stated,
"[N]othing in the statutory language indicates that Congress sought to
limit that protection to publicly traded securities, '411 although it can
be argued that the "commonly used in the securities trade language"
is such a limitation. A recent commentator recognized another
problem:
If settlement payments can exist only where there is a clearing pro-
cess and exposure on guaranties, then settlement payments could
never exist relating to forward contracts that do not involve any
clearing process, which includes most all such contracts. This would
appear contrary to Congress' intent, since the statute refers to set-
tlement payments relating to forward contracts and forward con-
tract merchants and does not make any reference to the need for a
clearing agency.412
1. Legislative History
Is Zahn's holding a true reflection of congressional intent? Did
Congress truly intend for § 546(e) to only apply to transfers that went
through the clearance and settlement system? As discussed above,413
Congress's general purpose behind § 546(e) was that it was "intended
to minimize the displacement caused in the commodities and securi-
ties markets in the event of a major bankruptcy affecting those
industries. "414
Section 546(e) began as § 764(c) in the 1978 overhaul of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.415 The legislative history of § 764(c) stated, first, that
the new § 764 only applied in Chapter 7 cases.416 More importantly, it
stated that § 764(c) "insulates variation margin payments and other
deposits from the avoiding powers except to the extent of actual fraud
under section 548(a)(1). This facilitates prepetition transfers and pro-
tects the ordinary course of business in the market. '41 7 At that time,
Congress only intended for settlement payments to include those
411. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI III), 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010).
412. Kelch, supra note 159, at 99 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6) & 546(e) (2000)).
413. See supra Part IlI.A.1.c.
414. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583, 1982 WL
25042.
415. Id. at 3.
416. H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6347, 1977 WL 9628.
417. Id. at 6348 (1977).
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transfers that occur in the ordinary course of business. 418 This has
caused some to conclude that § 546(e), § 764(c)'s descendant, should
be interpreted narrowly to exclude LBO payments. 41 9
However, in 1982, § 764(c) was repealed and replaced with
§ 546(d). 420 As became a trend, with the 1982 changes Congress
"broaden[ed] the commodities market protections and expressly ex-
tend[ed] similar protections to the securities market. '421 Although
some at the time claimed that the new § 546(d) "did not expand the
underlying provisions of former section 764(c)," 422 this is not entirely
accurate. As the House Report stated, "The new section § 546(d) re-
iterates the provisions of current section 764(c). ' 423 But at the same
time it stated that, "[t]he new section also encompasses both stockbro-
kers and securities clearing agencies. ' 424 The underlying provisions
may not have changed, but Congress expanded its scope.
Congress again amended § 546 in 1984.425 This time, the old
§ 546(d) was renumbered to become the current § 546(e), 426 and
§ 546(f) was added to protect margin payments and settlement pay-
ments made to repo participants in connection with repurchase agree-
ments.427 In addition, "financial institution" was added to § 546(e)'s
list of entities, and the § 741(8) definition of settlement payment ad-
ded the phrase "final settlement payment. '428 With these changes,
Congress once again furthered a general policy of expanding what is
not subject to the trustee's avoidance powers.
After amending § 546(e) in 1986 to insert a comma, 429 § 546(g) was
added in 1990 to protect transfers under swap agreements from avoid-
418. Rand, supra note 200, at 98.
419. Id. at 97.
420. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585, 1982 WL
25042.
421. Id. at 2.
422. Rand, supra note 200, at 102 (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 546.05 (Alan N. Res-
nick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.).
423. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585, 1982 WL
25042.
424. Id.
425. Rand, supra note 200, at 95.
426. Jonas v. Farmer Bros. Co. (In re Comark), 145 B.R. 47, 51 n.10 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992).
427. Rand, supra note 200, at 95; Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, Title III § 393, (1984 HR 5174). See supra note 203.
428. Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527, 534 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 2005) (citing Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, Title III §§ 461(d) & 482(6), (1984 HR 5174)).
429. Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1009 Stat. 3088, Title II
§ 283() (1986 HR 5316).
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ance. 430 Similar to § 546(e), this amendment's purpose was "to ensure
that the swap and forward contract financial markets are not destabi-
lized by uncertainties regarding the treatment of their financial instru-
ments under the Bankruptcy Code."'431  Once again, Congress
implemented a policy of protecting financial markets from the effects
of bankruptcy. As the House Report stated, "U.S. bankruptcy law has
long accorded special treatment to transactions involving financial
markets, to minimize volatility," and "[a]s new financial instruments
have been developed, Congress has amended the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code to keep pace in promoting speed and certainty in resolving com-
plex financial transactions. '432
After more minor changes to § 546(e) in 1994433 and 1998, 4 3 4 § 546
was amended in 2005 to add a subsection to "prohibit[ ] a trustee from
avoiding a warehouse lien for storage, transportation, or other costs
incidental to the storage and handling of goods. '435 Section 546 was
also amended "to provide that transfers made under or in connection
with a master netting agreement may not be avoided by a trustee ex-
cept where such transfer is made with actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud and not taken in good faith. ' 436 Neither of these changes re-
late to § 546(e), the definition of settlement payment, or LBOs, but as
with previous changes, it indicates a congressional intent to expand
what is protected from the trustee's avoidance powers. More impor-
tantly, Congress also amended § 546(e) in 2005 to add the term "fi-
nancial participant" to the list of entities that may make or receive a
settlement payment.437 Once again, § 546(e)'s scope was expanded.
430. Bankruptcy Act Amendment of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, 104 Stat. 267, Title I § 103
(1990 HR 4612).
431. H.R. REP. No. 101-484, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 223, 1990 WL
92539.
432. Id. at 2.
433. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, Title II § 204(b)
(1994 HR 5116).
434. See The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-
183, 112 Stat. 517, § 3(c) (1998) (1998 S 1244).
435. H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 87 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 153, 2005 WL
832198.
436. Id. at 132. A "'master netting agreement' is defined as 'an agreement providing for the
exercise of rights, including rights of netting, setoff, liquidation, termination, acceleration, or
close out, under or in connection with one or more contracts . . . ,' including swap agreements,
forward contracts and commodity contracts." The Effect of the New Bankruptcy Code on Safe
Harbor Transactions, McDERMOtr NEWSLETrERS (McDermott Will & Emery), Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nidetail/object-id/2546b8ca-c8ea-414b-
b23c-e1936175ca82.cfm.
437. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23, Title IX § 907(o)(2), (3). See also Mark G. Douglas, The Evolution of a Majority
Rule: Two Circuits Rule Payments to Shareholders in Private LBOs Shielded from Avoidance by
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The most recent changes to § 546(e) in 2006 added the "(or for the
benefit of)" language after the "made by or to" phrase. 438 This
change made it clear that not only is a settlement payment "made by
or to" a financial institution unavoidable, but it is also unavoidable if
it is "for the benefit of" that financial institution. 439 In addition, Con-
gress added a long clause to the middle of § 546(e) to include "a trans-
fer.., in connection with a securities contract.., commodity contract
• . . or forward contract .... "440 Once again, Congress intended to
"help reduce systemic risk in the financial markets by clarifying the
treatment of certain financial products in cases of bankruptcy or
insolvency." 441
2. Congress's Intent
Viewed in isolation, each of these legislative changes appears insig-
nificant. But viewed as a whole, it is apparent that Congress has con-
tinually expanded the exceptions to the trustee's avoidance powers.
Congress may have never envisioned that § 546(e) would shield LBOs
from avoidance when it revised the law in 1982 or in 1984 when it
enacted the repo amendments, or even in 1990 when it added the
swap amendments, 442 but this is uncertain. Congress is omniscient in
theory, but this is far from true in fact. Whether Congress was aware
of how § 546(e) would be applied is therefore a debatable point with
no clearly discernable answer based strictly on the record. One may
speculate, but that only yields a guess, educated though it may be.
What is more certain is the policy Congress had in mind as it made
these legislative changes. Congress stated as follows in 1982:
The commodities and securities markets operate through a com-
plex system of accounts and guarantees. Because of the structure of
the clearing systems in these industries and the sometimes volatile
nature [of] the markets, certain protections are necessary to prevent
the insolvency of one commodity or security firm from spreading to
other firms and possible [sic] threatening the collapse of the af-
fected market.
Settlement Payment Defense, 8 JONEs DAY Bus. RESTRUCTURING REV. No. 5, at 4, 5 (2009),
available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b50abd6O-7594-4b87-ae0c-4786373877de/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment48ea26e3-2442-49b7-971d-4afalde9999BRR%2Sept.-
Oct.%202009.pdf.
438. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006); Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
390, 120 Stat. 2691, § 5(b) (Westlaw, 2006 HR 5585).
439. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
440. Id.; see supra note 103 for the full text comparing these changes.
441. H.R. REP. No. 109-648 (Part 1), at 1-2 (2005), 2006 WL 6165926.
442. Rand, supra note 200, at 103.
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The bankruptcy code now expressly provides certain protections
to the commodities market to protect against such a "ripple
effect. "443
A private stock sale may not implicate the "complex system of ac-
counts and guarantees ' 444 of the clearance and settlement system, but
as the Tenth Circuit in Kaiser recognized, "[t]he danger of a 'ripple
effect' on the entire market is at least as inherent in the avoidance of
an LBO as it is in the avoidance of a routine stock sale."' 445 And if
there is a danger of such a ripple effect in the LBO of a public com-
pany, as was the issue in Kaiser, there may be the same danger for the
LBO of a private company. In discussing such a private LBO, the
Eighth Circuit stated, "[W]e can see how Congress might have be-
lieved undoing similar transactions could impact those markets, and
why Congress might have thought it prudent to extend protection to
payments such as these. ' 446 The reversal of any LBO payments could
impact the nation's financial markets because at least a portion of
such payments would likely be reinvested.447 But this could be true of
nearly any fraudulent transaction. Beyond the broad policy of pro-
tecting markets against negative ripple effects, it is uncertain if Con-
gress specifically had LBOs, public or private, in mind when it enacted
and revised § 546(e), but it is at least possible that such a concern
could have been a factor.
What is also more certain is that when Congress acted in 2005 and
2006, it was an established fact that § 546(e) was being applied to pub-
lic company LBOs. Recall that the Tenth Circuit in Kaiser and the
Third Circuit in In re Resorts both applied § 546(e) to the LBOs of
publicly held companies as early as 1991 and 1999 respectively.448 The
timing for courts applying § 546(e) to privately held LBOs is different
as the first case to make that leap from public to private LBOs was In
re Loranger on April 7, 2005. 449 Other cases applying § 546(e) to
443. H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583, 1982 WL
25042.
444. Id.
445. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583,
1982 WL 25042).
446. Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2009).
447. Id.
448. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230,
1240-41 (10th Cir. 1991); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d
505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999).
449. See supra note 12; Loranger Mfg. Corp. v. PNC Bank (In re Loranger Mfg. Corp.), 324
B.R. 575, 585-86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005).
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LBOs of private companies quickly followed Loranger, and the pace
has hastened ever since.450
Furthermore, since Congress's most recent change to § 546(e) in
2006, three circuit courts have acted to apply § 546(e) to the LBOs of
privately held companies.451 While each of these cases is of recent
vintage, perhaps too recent for Congress to act, their outcomes were
telegraphed by bankruptcy courts and district courts that ruled identi-
cally.452 This alone is not solid evidence that Congress intended for
§ 546(e) to be applied to the LBOs of privately held companies.
However, in combination with all its other indications of intent, it is
possible to argue that Congress has intentionally decided not to act,
perhaps because decisions such as QSI have served Congress's broad
policy of protecting financial markets from bankruptcy-related disrup-
tions. The counter to this, of course, is that Congress has demon-
strated the ability to expand the law when it desires and if it did not
create an amendment to protect LBOs specifically then it did not in-
tend to protect them.453 But why should Congress make a specific
exception for LBOs when one possible interpretation of the plain
meaning of the statute is broad enough to include them? Congress
may not have actively wished for § 546(e) to apply to the LBOs of
publicly held companies, but it has done nothing to keep that from
happening. Overall, these arguments provide a weak indication of
congressional intent.
3. Congressional Intent Conclusion
Congressional intent does not justify applying § 546(e) to LBOs of
private companies. Each piece of the legislative history puzzle alone
is ambiguous and inconclusive. However, it is possible to make an
argument in favor of congressional intent justifying the application of
§ 546(e) to LBOs of private companies. Over the years, Congress has
continually amended § 546, and each time it has expanded its cover-
age. This alone is a reflection of Congress's intent. Congress's most
450. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Clark (In re Nat'l Forge Co.), 344
BR. 340 (W.D. Pa. 2006); Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.), 355 B.R. 629
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 366 B.R. 318,
325 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost (In re Contemporary Indus.
Corp.), No. BK98-80382, 2007 WL 5256918, at *5 (Bankr. D. Neb. June 29, 2007).
451. Applying § 546(e) to shield LBOs of private companies are the Third Circuit (Brandt v.
B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
2389 (2010))), the Sixth Circuit (QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d
545 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010)), and the Eighth Circuit (Contemporary
Indus. Corp., 564 F.3d at 986).
452. See, e.g., Quality Stores (Bankr.), 355 B.R. at 636; In re Plassein, 366 B.R. at 326.
453. Rand, supra note 200, at 103.
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recent 2006 changes also reflect this intent to expand what is protected
from a bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers. Finally, faced with
court action applying § 546(e) to the LBOs of privately held compa-
nies, Congress has failed to react and make its will clear.
However, congressional silence and inaction are not strong indica-
tions of intent. A complete consideration of Congress's intent does
not definitively determine whether § 546(e) should apply to LBOs of
private companies. Congress has said nothing directly on this topic
one way or the other. Arguments may be made in both directions, but
none are strong enough to permit a firm conclusion. As with the stat-
utory language, congressional intent is ambiguous.
C. Public Policy
As the Resorts case indicates, "Section 546 is at the intersection of
'two important national legislative policies... on a collision course'-
the policies of bankruptcy and securities law. ' 454 The statutory lan-
guage and congressional intent of applying § 546(e) to the LBOs of
privately held companies is ambiguous, but can it justified by consid-
erations of good public policy? The issue is debatable based on one's
values, but all told, applying § 546(e) to LBOs of privately held enti-
ties is not good public policy.
1. Conflict within the Law
As a first general point, § 546(e) creates tension between bank-
ruptcy policies that allow a trustee to avoid transactions involving
preferential or fraudulent transactions and policies that protect settled
securities transactions.455 This displays the inconsistency in the Bank-
ruptcy Code that § 546(e) creates and reveals why so many courts
have struggled with its application. As the QSI district court stated,
"Given the cross purposes of bankruptcy creditors and former share-
holders or other prebankruptcy payment recipients, the § 546(e) ex-
emption has become a battleground of semantics and legal
frameworks as litigants and the courts attempt to establish its limits
within the statutory language. '456 Section 546(e) renders Congress's
policies inconsistent, which inevitably leads to legal conflict. "Conse-
quently, some 25 years after the enactment of the exemption from
avoidance for settlement payments in the securities trade, the courts
454. Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.
1999) (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. (Bevill, Bresler & Schulman
Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer Sav. & Loan Ass'n), 878 F.2d 742, 751 (3d Cir. 1989)).
455. QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (QSI 1I), 382 B.R. 731, 738 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
456. Id.
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continue to be a forum for disputes over the construction of §§ 546(e)
and 741(8). ' '457 This is a waste of resources and a drag on our eco-
nomic and legal system (at least as it touches LBOs and bankruptcy
courts). For this reason alone, Congress should make its will known,
clearly and unambiguously, on one side or the other.
The same criticism can be leveled against the U.S. Supreme Court,
which has consistently refused to address this issue. It has denied peti-
tions of certiorari in Kaiser, Munford, Resorts, QSI, and Plassein.458
For those who believe that the Supreme Court has a duty to resolve
insoluble circuit splits, 459 the Court is neglecting its duty.
A concrete result of this conflict is that courts have been reluctant
to apply § 546(e) because the policy behind it is flawed. Courts have
trouble believing that Congress actually intended to shield privately
held securities from fraudulent transfer law. The policy makes little
sense, so some courts assume it must be an absurd result. This leads
to further legal conflict and uneven and unsure application of the law.
Another result is venue shopping. The effect of venue shopping in
bankruptcy is a controversial topic, 460 but if one accepts that it is
harmful, then § 546(e) surely exacerbates the problem because "[t]he
application of the settlement payment defense in the context of an
LBO has been far from uniform. ' '461 The Third Circuit in particular 462
has led the way in applying § 546(e) to shield LBOs of all kinds. On
457. Id.
458. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230 (10th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1213 (1992); Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Mun-
ford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. DFA Inv. Dimensions Grp., Inc. v.
Munford, Inc., 522 U.S. 1068 (1998) and cert. denied sub nom. Munford v. Munford, Inc., 522
U.S. 1068 (1998); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 (3d
Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Sun Int'l N. Am., Inc. v. Lowenschuss, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999);
QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.) (QSI II1), 571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010); Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co.,(In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590
F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2389 (2010).
459. See generally LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (New York Univ. Press 2001)
(detailing the different mechanisms the Supreme Court uses to avoid deciding an issue and dis-
cussing the Court's reasons behind these avoidances, such as judicial economy).
460. See generally LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (The Univ. of Michigan Press 2006); Stephen
J. Lubben, Delaware's Irrelevance, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 267 (2008); Theodore Eisen-
berg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large
Chapter I1 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999).
461. Ronald R. Sussman & Michael Klein, Do Wire Transfers Really Protect Shareholders in
Private LBOs? Not in the 2d-and Perhaps Other -Circuits, J. OF CORP. RENEWAL, (2008),
available at http://64.27.92.38/files/tbls5SiteRepository/FileUpload2l/1406/Article%20-%20May
%2008%20-%20JCR%2OSussman%20Klein.pdf.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 389-92.
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the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit has refused entirely to apply
§ 546(e) to LBO payments. 463 The results of any particular case could
therefore depend entirely on the venue where the case is decided.
464
This situation leads to uneven and unsure application of the law.
2. Shareholders Bear No Risk
It is well established that LBOs often end disastrously, especially in
an economic downturn.465 Some of the same things that make LBOs
attractive, namely low capital requirements for the acquiring entity,
synergy gains by expanding operations, efficiency gains by eliminating
excessive diversification, improved management and operating effi-
ciency, and the benefits of leveraging,466 can also make them potential
mistakes. As in any leveraged transaction, the lender takes enormous
risks. If the deal works out profitably, the lender is safe. But if profits
are illusory and bankruptcy results, the lender stands to bear the loss,
or at least a portion of it where it is undersecured.
For the selling stockholders in an LBO, § 546(e) makes their role
entirely risk-free. Under normal circumstances, a selling stockholder
might be reluctant to vote for or approve an LBO that could end up
dooming the company out of fear that a bankruptcy trustee will later
avoid the transaction.467 Section 546(e) removes that risk. It transfers
all risk away from the sellers. As one commentator put it, "The avoid-
ance of LBO payments would prevent stockholders from enjoying the
illicit rewards of fraudulent transfers and would cause stockholders to
consider tender offers more carefully and reject offers likely to invite
bankruptcy. ' 468 Sometimes, stockholders can appear as innocent by-
standers to an LBO they had no power to stop. In such situations, it is
natural to view them as less responsible for an LBO that later fails.469
This is less likely to occur in the case of a privately held company,
especially where there are a small number of stockholders. Neverthe-
less, allowing bankruptcy trustees to avoid LBOs can transfer the risk
of bankruptcy from creditors, where it stands now, to stockholders
463. In re Munford, 98 F.3d at 606. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
464. Sussman, & Klein, supra note 461.
465. See Nichalos Riccio, Recent LBO Stories: High Leverage, Low Ratings, and Bad Timing,
STANDARD & POOR'S, RATINGS DIRECT, Mar. 26, 2009, at 13, available at http://www.business
week.com/investor/content/mar2009/pi20090325847041.htm ("It's hard to look at most recent
LBOs as successful by any measure. In our view, only a few did pretty well and showed some
progress from a credit quality perspective.").
466. Leveraged Buy-out-Company Acquisition Method, VALUE BASED MGMT., http://www.
valuebasedmanagement.net/methods-leveraged-buy-out.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
467. Rand, supra note 200, at 104.
468. Id.
469. Douglas, supra note 54.
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where it belongs. This would deter stockholders from gambling with
creditors' money.470 While § 546(e) may protect the stability of equity
securities markets, it decreases the stability of debt markets.471 By
transferring some risk to lenders, that decreases the desire to lend and
inhibits the free flow of capital, and that hurts everyone in the econ-
omy, regardless of one's proximity to an LBO.
In some circumstances, LBOs can be positive forces in the economy
and policies that protect them should therefore be encouraged. Two
eminent names in bankruptcy scholarship have looked upon LBOs fa-
vorably. 472 In 1985, Professors Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H.
Jackson wrote a seminal article that concluded, "Fraudulent convey-
ance law should never apply to armslength transactions, even if it ap-
pears after the fact that the debtor's actions injured the creditors. ''473
One of their points was that new management can be an enormous
benefit to a company, especially when those new managers are per-
sonally invested in the enterprise. 474 If creditors can retroactively at-
tack LBOs, this will be a deterrent, even for those LBOs that would
otherwise be in everyone's best interests.475 Baird and Jackson's
views are not universally held however. Other commentators have
concluded that "the constructive fraud provisions do not necessarily
lead to over-deterrence of justified takeovers. Indeed, the reverse is
true: absence of fraudulent conveyance remedies could under deter
unjustified LBOs. '' 476 Where LBOs are truly positive-where they
are not overly risky in other words-those LBOs will continue as nor-
mal. Ending § 546(e)'s protection will only deter overly risky LBOs.
A full review of the tax consequences of LBOs are beyond the
scope of this paper, but it may be true that the debt incurred by an
LBO can act as a tax shelter. 477 This, however, is yet another aspect
of shifting the risk of an LBO. Once again, the risk is shifted to a
party who had no vote in approving or denying an LBO. Here, the
risk is shifted to tax-collecting entities, which ultimately is to the detri-
ment of taxpayers. Instead, the risk should lie where traditional prin-
470. Rand, supra note 200, at 104.
471. Id.
472. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 2.
473. Id. at 854.
474. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 179 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(citing Baird & Jackson, supra note 2).
475. Id. (citing Baird & Jackson, supra note 2).
476. Jenny B. Wahl & Edward T. Wahl, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts:
Remedy or Insurance Policy?, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343, 344 (1990).
477. Garfinkel, supra note 167, at 53. However, note that the current length and complexity
of 26 U.S.C. § 163 puts this proposition in doubt.
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ciples of corporate law say it should rest-with the equity holders. 478
It is axiomatic to say that debt should be paid before equity.479 The
policy behind § 546(e) turns that well-worn principle on its head.
3. An Issue of "Fairness"
There is also an issue of fairness here: "[W]ho should lose the value
of his investment, the shareholder who voted for the fraudulent
buyout or the innocent bondholder whose trust was violated"? 480 A
sophisticated lender should be in a good position to conduct due dili-
gence and protect its investment, but what of other creditors who have
no say in an LBO? Unsecured creditors and especially pre-LBO cred-
itors have no vote in approving a pending LBO. The risk of a post-
LBO company's debt is borne most by unsecured creditors who are
least likely to be paid in a resulting bankruptcy. 48' The LBO lender,
who normally assumes a senior position, carries a certain amount of
risk to be sure, at least where it is undersecured. 482 But it seems par-
ticularly unfair for a selling shareholder to ignore due diligence and
walk away with profits while leaving creditors to bear the loss when
the debt-ridden edifice collapses. This injustice is even more galling
where syndicates of lenders reap huge fees up front, all justified by the
riskiness of the loan-the riskier, the more potential profit. Un-
secured creditors reap no such rewards.
The QSI bankruptcy court recognized this "unfairness. '483 The law
"permits transferees of an otherwise possibly avoidable fraudulent
conveyance to insulate themselves from liability by using a financial
institution to effectuate the settlement payment in exchange of their
stock in an LBO transaction. '484 This could lead to obvious abuse.
As the bankruptcy court opined, this may not be "unjust" in light of
the language of the Code, but it is almost certainly "unfair. ' 485 Given
that the Code is actually ambiguous rather than "plain" as the bank-
ruptcy court ruled, this unfairness is magnified to the point where it is
unjust.
478. Morse, supra note 19, at 332 ("'debt' before 'equity"').
479. Id.
480. Rand, supra note 200, at 104.
481. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635,645-46 (3d Cir. 1991); Myron
M. Sheinfeld & David H. Goodman, LBO: Legitimate Business Organization or Large Bank-
ruptcy Opportunity?, 2 J. OF BANKR. L. & PRAC. 799, 805 (1993) ("If the LBO is allowed to
stand, the loss will be borne by the unsecured or subordinated creditors.").
482. Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 646.
483. Quality Stores, Inc. v. Alford (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) (QSI 1), 355 B.R. 629, 635 n.5
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006).
484. Id.
485. Id.
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4. Risk of Fraud, Especially for Private Companies
Fraud in an LBO is always a concern, but it is a special risk when
dealing with the LBO of a closely held company. Section 546(e) in
particular "provides a unique opportunity for owners of closely held
corporations to insulate their receipt of corporate distributions from
later avoidance. '486 As an extreme example, a sole shareholder of
a corporation could redeem his or her stock, causing the company
to become insolvent, yet be protected by § 546(e) in bankruptcy,
fearing only an intentional fraudulent conveyance action under
§ 548(a)(1)(A). 487
The knowledge that risky LBOs are protected by § 546(e) may
tempt otherwise intelligent businesspeople into obviously unsound
deals simply because they know § 546(e) will protect them. It may
even tempt otherwise honest businesspeople to work the edges of ac-
tually fraudulent behavior, knowing that § 546(e)'s "loophole" will
protect a certain level of deceit. One commentator states, "The main
lesson to be learned from Quality Stores [QSI] is that proceeds from
an LBO should be 'funneled' through a financial institution as a 'set-
tlement payment' to increase the possibility the payments will be
shielded from fraudulent transfer scrutiny., 488 If the law gives an hon-
est person a legal way to do something that otherwise is unfair, the
virtue and morality we expect (or at least hope for) from our business
leaders will quickly fall by the wayside. Using the loophole for profit,
whether ill gained or not, will become the norm, fairness be damned.
As one court put it, a plain reading of § 546(e) "would essentially con-
vert that statutory provision into a blanket transactional cleansing
mechanism for any entity savvy enough to funnel payments for the
purchase and sale of privately held stock through a financial institu-
tion."489 In a nutshell, this is the problem with the policy that § 546(e)
puts into effect. This is an unwise policy, especially given the ambigu-
ity of the statute's language and the uncertainty of Congress's intent.
The law magnifies the risk of fraud because it implicitly encourages it.
486. John F. Carlton, Courts Split in Interpretation of §546(e) Avoidance Action Defense, ABI
PUBLIC COMPANIES & CLAIMS TRADING COMMI--EE NEWSL., (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria,
Va.) Oct. 2007, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/publicComp/Vol4
Num3/Courts.html#2.
487. Id.
488. Hesse, supra note 22, at 23.
489. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (In re Grand Eagle
Cos., Inc.), 288 B.R. 484, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
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5. Policy Conclusion
Applying § 546(e) to protect LBOs of privately held companies is
an unwise policy choice. The current unsettled situation leads to une-
ven application of the law, venue shopping, and unnecessary legal
conflict. More importantly, the risks of LBOs going bad are borne
almost entirely by unsecured creditors who have no power to approve
or disapprove LBOs. This encourages unnecessarily risky LBOs and
results in unfairness. In the particular circumstance of privately held
companies, § 546(e)'s cleansing effect magnifies the risk of fraud. It
essentially makes constructive fraud legal, and it encourages actual
fraud because by merely funneling LBO payments through the proper
conduit, selling shareholders need not fear a bankruptcy trustee's
powers of avoidance. All these factors make applying § 546(e) to pro-
tect LBOs of privately held companies a bad policy choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
When considering the Sixth Circuit's decision in QSI and the ques-
tion of whether § 546(e) should be applied to LBOs of privately held
entities, three conclusions can be made. First, the statute's lack of
plain meaning does not justify applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private
companies. The term settlement payment should properly be given a
broad definition, and there is nothing in § 546(e) to specifically ex-
clude LBOs of private entities, but neither is there any language to
specifically include them. Second, congressional intent does not jus-
tify applying § 546(e) to LBOs of private companies because Congress
has not expressed its will directly. Although Congress has effected a
broad policy choice to protect securities markets and it has not acted
to overturn case law, that is not enough to reasonably conclude that
Congress intends for § 546(e) to protect LBOs of private companies.
Third, applying § 546(e) to protect LBOs of private companies is an
unwise policy choice. The uneven and unsettled application of
§ 546(e) that creates unnecessary legal conflict, the unfairness of who
bears the risk when an LBO goes bad, and the increased danger of
fraud when § 546(e) is applied to closely held corporations all com-
bine to make this a bad policy choice. Therefore, when applying
§ 546(e) to the LBOs of private companies, the ambiguity of the plain
meaning and congressional intent arguments should give way, and the
wisest policy choice should control. Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code should not be applied to LBOs of private companies.
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